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The benefits of being a bondholder are well appreciated and documented in the world of 
investments. However, most of these holdings are in the risk free (no chances of defilUlting) 
government bonds (Treasuries). It follows then that by investing in the riskier bonds 
(corporate bonds); the investor should reap more benefits (higher returns). The argument lies 
in the trade off, yield and risk. higher yield results in higher credit risk (the probability of 
default is higher). The answer is to invest in corporate bonds and simultaneously find ways to 
minimise the credit risk associated with those purchases. Credit derivatives (options in 
particular for this paper) are financial instruments that can aid in the management of credit 
risk by insuring against adverse movements in the credit quality of the borrower. That is. if 
the borrower defaults, the bondholder will incur loss on the bond investment but the losses 
can be offset by gains in the credit derivative. The credit risk can be fully offset on condition 
that the credit derivative is priced and hedged properly. 
This paper looks at the use of the Hull & White Model and the Jarrow & Turnbull Model to 
price and hedge credit risky options using corporate bonds and their comparable Treasury 
bonds. The models are taken from their papers. "The Price of Default", (1992) and "Pricing 
Derivatives on Financial Securities Subject to Credit Risk ", (1995), respectively. Their 
models develop procedures to estimate the expected loss of default on a derivative using the 
price of risky debt issued by the counterparty in the derivative contract. 
The Jarrow & Turnbull Model is taken from their paper that uses the 'Foreign Currency 
Analogy' of Jarrow and Turnbull (1991). It decomposes the dollar payoff from the risky 
security into a certain payoff and a "spot exchange rate" to price both the credit risk from the 
underlying asset and the credit risk ofthe writer of the derivative security. It is a discrete time 
model with two variables of interest, the one-period default-free rate of interest and the 
default event where both variables follow a binomial process. The model can be used to 












The Hull and White model is both a discrete and continuous time model that looks at the 
impact of credit risk on class 2 & 3 derivatives as defined later in the section on credit 
derivatives. Ideally, the paper will explore the use of these models to manage credit risk of 
corporate bonds from Emerging markets, such as South Africa, and Brazil. For this paper, 
due to reasons mentioned later, US bonds, specifically the US Treasuries and US corporate 
bonds are used instead of Treasuries and corporate bonds from either South Africa, or Brazil. 
Two different options are used for all the calculations, we explore the use of a warrant 
(special case of an option) issued by a Triple-A firm and secondly use of options on bonds 
(both risky and risk free bonds). The former is explored as an alternative to using a triple-A 
option because it proved difficult to obtain these triple-A options in the market. This is as a 
result of the fact that most options are over-the-counter issues (contracts between private 
parties) and thus, getting the data is difficult. Options on bonds, the most suitable credit 
derivatives to use with these models are also over-the-counter instruments. However, this is 
overcome by pricing options on the available bonds using the Black-Scholes model or 
precisely the Black Model (see Hull: 2000). The project also explores the use of both coupon 
and zero-coupon bonds in the pricing models, on condition that the risky debt is used relative 
to its particular benchmark Treasury bond. 
Section I gives an overview of bonds, specifically looking at the definition of bonds, the 
bond markets and the risks associated with bonds. Then Section 2 looks at the two models, 
the Jarrow & Turnbull model and the Hull & White model, their application in pricing (credit 
risk management tool) credit risky options using corporate bonds. Before discussing the two 
models above, a brieflook at the derivatives and their history, as well as examples of credit 
derivatives are given. Lastly, Section 3 concludes this paper with a comparison of the two 
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1. OVERVIEW OF BONDS 
1.1 Introduction 
This section begins with the definition of bonds and a further expansion of the components 
that are enveloped in the definition. It is followed by a look at the world bond markets, their 
development and characteristics. The bond market discussion is then divided into a 
discussion on the developed and emerging market bond markets. The United States of 
America (referred to as the US from henceforth) is used to represent the developed markets 
as well as the standard for the structure and constitution of bond markets in general. Brazil 
together with South Africa (SA) is used as representatives of the emerging bond markets. A 
brieflook at Brazil's corporate bond's credit relationship with the developed market (US) 
corporate debt and the reasons for such a relationship is discussed. This is followed by a brief 
look at the SA bond market, specifically, the SA bond exchange (BESA) and its notable 
historical event'), and a discussion on the different sectors that make up the SA bond market. 
1.2 Definition 
A bond is a debt instrument requiring the issuer (also known as the debtor or borrower) to 
repay to the bondholder (lender or investor) the amount borrowed (the principal) plus 
interest (coupon payment) over a specified period of time (term to maturity). At the end of 
the period (at maturity) the borrower repays the full initial amount borrowed (Fabozzi: 2000). 
Myers (l984) suggested that firms prefer retained earnings (available liquid assets) as their 
main source of funds for investments. Next in order of preference is debt, and last comes 
external equity (issuing new shares). This is mainly because unlike issuing new equity it does 
not result in a shareholding dilution for existing shareholders and secondly, the ownership 
composition of the firm does not change. In other words, issuing new shares results in change 
of ownership structure whereas issuing a bond does not result in ownership changes. As a 











the principal amount lent to the debt-issuing firm. Bonds are suitable for both investors 
looking for capital gains and income growth. 
A bond provides three sources of inc omel cash flow to an investor over the time it is held: 
1. The contractual periodic interest payments when the counterparty (borrower) honours its 
promise or their contractual obligations according to the indenture or bond covenants. 
2. Interest gainedfrom reinvestment of the periodic interest payments. As one receives the 
periodic interest payments one invests the amount at the prevailing market rates although 
when pricing bonds it is assumed that these payments are reinvested at the yield-to-maturity. 
3. Capital gains resulting from the disposal of the security whenever market interest rates 
fall. A basic fixed trading rule in the market for fixed income securities is that the interest 
rates and the security prices always move in opposite directions. When interest rates rise, 
prices fall, and when interest rates drop, prices will therefore rise (capital gains received from 
selling the bond). 
All the important facts dealing with the rights of the holder and the obligations of the issuer 
are contained in the "indenture" agreement (Contract note), the legal document that spells 
out its terms and conditions. The agreement details the face value of the bond, the repayment 
schedule (of the coupon, and the principal amounts), the frequency of payment, the 
description of any property to be pledged as collateral, the steps that will be taken by the 
bondholder in the event of default, and callable features that may be present. A brief 
description of each of the components to the indenture agreement follows. 
1.2.1 /[IJS uer 
One of the most important characteristics ofa bond is the nature of its issuer. The three 
largest issuers of debt are the government and its agencies, municipal governments, and 
corporations (both domestic and foreign). They issue sovereign bonds (Treasuries), 
municipal bonds, and corporate bonds (also simply known as corporates), respectively. 
Within each of these classes of issuers, however, one can find additional and significant 











contractual obligations to the investors or lenders. Domestic corporations, for example, 
include regulated utilities as well as unregulated manufacturers. 
1.2.2 Term to maturity 
This is the number of years over which the issuer has promised to meet the conditions ofthe 
obligation as contained in the bond's indenture. The maturity of a bond is the date that the 
debt ceases to exist, at which the issuer will redeem the bond by paying the principal. In 
practise, the term to maturity of a bond is simply referred to as its term or maturity. 
Technically, maturity denotes the date the bond will be redeemed, and the term to maturity 
denotes the number of years until that date. 
Bonds can be classified into three categories as a result of their term to maturity: Short-term 
bonds have a maturity of one to five years, medium-term bonds have a maturity of between 
five and twelve years, and finally long-term bonds have a maturity of more than twelve 
years. Usually, the maturity of a corporate bond is between 10 and 30 years, the shorter 
maturities are more characteristic of banking and financial issues, and utilities are more likely 
to employ the longer maturities. Government bonds range in life from 1 to 20 or more years 
(though technically, treasury issues of 1 to 10 years are known as Notes), but the number of 
bonds with maturities exceeding 10 years is relatively small (Michael D Joehnk: 1983). 
The maturity of a bond is a very important feature mainly because it indicates the time period 
over which the bondholder can expect to receive the coupon payments and the number of 
years before the principal amount is paid in full. Secondly, the yield received on a bond (its 
annual rate of return) depends on its term to maturity. Thirdly, the volatility (the price 
fluctuations) of a bond's price is dependent on its maturity too, specifically the longer the 
maturity the greater the price volatility resulting from market yield changes. Finally, bonds 
with long terms may be safer than debts with shorter maturities. The long term bond issues 
have a higher likelihood offinding favourable conditions for retirement, which usually 











1.2.3 The principal 
As previously mentioned, the principal is the amount that the issuer borrows and agrees to 
repay the bondholder (lender) either at maturity or at those times when the bond is called or 
retired according to sinking fund provisions. It is also the basis on which the coupon rests; 
the coupon is the product of the principal and the coupon rate. It is also known as the 
redemption value, maturity value, par value, or/ace value as it will be referred to for the rest 
of this paper. 
1.2.4 The coupon 
A coupon is the annual amount of the interest payment made to the bondholders during the 
life of the bond. The coupon rate multiplied by the face value gives the monetary value 
amount of the coupon where the coupon rate or nominal mte is the interest rate that the issuer 
agrees to pay each year. This is also the yearly sum of the periodic amounts paid per year. 
The periodic payments can be annually, semi-annually, or quarterly. I The coupons can 
either be fixed or floating rates, most bonds are still the tmditional fixed rate securities. 
Floating rates on the other hand, are bonds that have variable interest rates that are adjusted 
periodically according to an index tied to short-term Treasury bills or money markets or 
UBOR mte. While such bonds offer protection against increases in interest mtes, their yields 
are typically lower than those of fixed-rate securities with the same maturity. 
Most bonds are "bearer bonds" whose investors clip coupons and send them to the obligor 
for interest payments. Nobody's name is on the bond or the coupon; therefore, they are 
referred to as coupon bonds. The coupons are submitted twice a year and the authorized bank 
pays the interest. For instance, a twenty-year $1 ,000 bond paying 8% interest would have 40 
coupons for $40 each. Bearer bonds can be used like cash and are highly negotiable. There 
I Ashland Inc issued a corporate bond (ASf17 .97) on 271h of February 1995 witb a maturity of 10 years paying coupon semi-
annually at a coupon rate of 7.97% and had a faee value ofUS$100.00. Thus the coupon was $7.97 per year and 7.9712. 











are still many in circulation, however, the Tax Reform Act of 1982 ended the issuance of 
bearer bonds in the US. 
Some bonds are "registered bonds", and their owners receive the payment automatically at 
the appropriate time. There exists a cross between a coupon bond and registered bond known 
as a partially registered bond. These bonds come registered to a particular investor; however, 
it has coupons attached, which the bondholder has to send in for payment. Zero coupon 
bonds can also be issued, that is bond issues without any interest payments over the life of 
the bond except the repayment ofthe face value at maturity. The interest is indirectly 
embedded in the issue because the bond is always issued at a discount and redeemed for the 
full; face value at maturity ensuring that the lender gets compensated for lending and 
foregoing interest income in alternative investments. 
In Appendix AA, an article by The Federal Reserve Bank of New York on zeros and their 
history in the US Bond market is shown. It defines the zeros similarly to the definition 
provided above and looks at their birth and the initial perceptions of these new instruments 
by the bond investors, the public and the Federal authorities. 
1.3 The world bond market 
The bond market has experienced major expansion of bond markets especially in many 
emerging markets (the East Asian and Latin American countries such as Singapore, Mexico, 
and Brazil to name only a few). The bond markets are rapidly expanding world wide, but in 
many countries the growth is strongly biased towards government issued or government-
backed bonds. Trading volumes ofthese government issued bonds are very large mainly 
because of their attributes; default free (risk free), high liquidity, less monitoring. Whereas 
the corporate bonds seldom offer high liquidity and less monitoring because of the risk 











Bond markets world wide are bu i1t on: 
• the number of issuers with long-term financing needs; 
• investors with a need to invest in interest bearing securities. (A weakness in Africa 
and other emerging markets is that domestic savings are poorly mobilised and foreign 
investment needs to be vigorously encouraged to sustain growth). 
• intermediaries that bring together prospective investors and issuers; and 
• infrastructure that provides a secure, efficient and transparent structure. 
We take a look at the US bond market as a developed market followed by a look at Brazil 
and South Africa has the representatives of the emerging markets' bond markets. 
1.3.1 The US bond market 
United States is one of the very few countries with a flourishing and very liquid corporate 
bond market and an even larger over-the-counter market. It is evidently the largest bond 
market in the world. Most ofthe corporations use hybrid debt issues (issues with embedded 
derivatives such as convertible bonds) as a way to manage the risks involved rather than 
issuing straight debt and then buying/selling the necessary derivatives. Smithson and Chew 
(J 992) argued that hybrid debt offered corporate treasurers an efficient means of managing a 
variety of financial and operating risks, risks that in many cases could not be managed if the 
firm issued straight debt and then purchased derivatives. 
Fabozzi (2000) summarized the different sectors that constitute the US bond market, and 
consequently other markets as follows: 
The treasury sector includes securities issued by the U.S government and therefore, they 
have the full backing of the U.S governmenLlt is argued that there is no probability of 
default at all by the government, considering that it always has the option to print more 
money as a last resort to service its contractual obligations. And some in that respect will 
argue that such actions will bring up the question of the Reserve bank's independence from 












Treasury Bills (T -bills) have maturities of3 months and 6 months. They are auctioned once 
every week and once every month, 1 year T-bills are auctioned. These are a direct short-term 
obligation of the U.S. government. T -bills do not pay interest they are purchased at a 
discount, for example one might buy a $ 10,000 three-month T -bill for $9,700. The investor 
would then receive $10,000 when the T-bill reached maturity in 3 months. T-bills are the 
only Treasury security issued at a discount. They are also the only Treasury security issued 
without a stated interest rate. The interest rate is determined at auction. T -bills are also 
offered in book entry form only, that is, the investor does not receive a certificate. T -bills are 
also highly liquid. u.s. Treasury Notes (T-notes) are direct obligations ofthe U.S. 
government. These notes have maturities from one year to ten years. T -notes pay interest on 
a semi-annual basis and they always expire at par value. The different length notes are 
auctioned at different periods throughout the year. U.S. Treasury Bonds (T-bonds) are also 
direct obligations ofthe U.S. government. They pay interest on a semi-annual basis. These 
have long-term maturities of 1 0 years to 30 years. The 30-year T -bonds are callab Ie 
beginning 5 years prior to maturity. 
The agency sector is the smallest sector in the U.S. It includes securities issued by federally 
related institutions and government backed enterprises. The U.S government does not 
directly issue them but they are, however, considered as 'moral obligations' of the U.S 
government. These include the likes of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the 
latter sister agent, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA's or Ginnie Mae). 
The municipal sector is where the state and local governments raise their funds by issuing 
debt securities. They issue mainly 10Us. The mortgage sector is where the securities are 
backed by mortgage loans. These are loans borrowed by individuals in order to purchase 
residential property or an entity to purchase commercial property. 
The corporate sector includes securities issued by both non-U.S and U.S corporations in the 
United States (mainly doJlar denominated) namely; bonds, medium-term notes, structured 











is commonly known as Yankee Bonds. This sector is further sub-divided into the investment 
grade and non-investment grade sectors as defined by the rating agencies. The rating 
agencies include Standard & Poor's Co, Moody's Investors Service, etc. Using the Standard 
and Poor's (S&P) classification, securities rated BBB or above is regarded as investment 
grade; lower rated bonds (non-investment grade) are more speculative and sometimes given 
the derogatory, and somewhat unjustified, name of junk bonds (see Jorion and Khoury: 
1996).2 
Some corporate bonds are issued with property (such as land, buildings, machinery, or other 
equipment) as collateral against the loan, just as you might offer collateral to a bank in 
exchange for a personal loan. These bonds are known as Secured bonds. When the issuing 
firm defaults on its obligations, or becomes insolvent the bondholders ofthese secured loans 
will claim any proceeds from the property sales. They have first claim over the proceeds 
ahead of other bondholders and shareholders (both ordinary and preferred shareholders). 
Bonds issued without collateral (Unsecured bonds), are called debentures. The value of a 
debenture is guaranteed by the good faith ofthe issuing corporation and the capacity of its 
earnings to repay interest and principal. If issued by a strong corporation the debenture can 
be a highly secure investment. In the event of liquidation, the holders of debenture bonds are 
placed ahead ofordinary and preferred shareholders but behind the holders of secured bonds. 
If you buy a secured bond, you will "pay" for the extra safety by receiving a lower interest 
rate or pay a higher price than you would have on a comparable unsecured bond. 
The US corporate bond market is the most liquid in the world, with daily trading volumes 
estimated at $10 billion. Issuance for 1999 was an estimated $677.0 billion. The total market 
value of outstanding corporate bonds in the United States at the end of 1999 was 
approximately $3.0 trillion. Buying and selling of corporate bonds is done on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), where major corporations' debt issues are quoted and traded daily. 
Surprisingly, more corporate bonds than stocks are listed on the NYSE. The diagram below 
shows the growth of corporate bonds issued in the US from 1980 to 1999 in billions of 
dollars. 


























1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 
Figure 1: The US corporate bond issuance between 1980 and 1999. 
Includes all non-convertible debt and medium-term-note issues, but excludes all federal and agency debt. 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data (2000), (See http://www.slk.com/bond/ig_corp.html). 
The rest of the corporate bonds are traded on the "over-the-counter (OTC)" market, which 
has no central location. The market is made up of bond dealers and brokers around the 
country who trade in these corporate bonds and many other types of debt securities. The 
OTC market is much bigger than the exchange market because most bond transactions, and 
even those involving listed issues, take place in this market. Investors in corporate bonds 
include large financial institutions, such as pension funds, endowments, mutual funds, 
insurance companies and banks as weJI as individuals 
Below is a diagrammatic representation of the corporate bonds outstanding over the years 
from 1980 to 1999 in US bond market. It shows a growth similar to the growth in corporate 











CORPORATf I.CNDS OUTSTAN DING 
















Figure 2: The US corporate bonds outstanding between 1980 and 1990 
Source: The Bond Market Association estimates; Federal Reserve System (2000). (See 
Http:f /www.slk.com/bond/ig_corp/big .html) . 
-~ 
1999 
It will be plausible to ask why an investor would be compelled to invest in corporate bonds 
considering their risk, when there are readily available risk-free Treasury issues. The 
following attributes listed below are the main motivations behind such compellation: 
1. Attractive yields. Corporate bonds offer higher yields than comparable-maturity 
government bonds or Certificate of Deposits (CDs) to compensate investors for taking on 
that extra risk over and above the risk-free rate. Consequently this high-yield potential is 
unfortunately accompanied by higher risks. 
2. Dependable income flow. Bonds provide steady income while preserving the investor's 
principal amount. 
3. Safety. They are evaluated and assigned a rating based on credit history and ability to 
repay obligations, the higher the rating, and the safer the investment. 
4. Diversity. Corporate bonds provide the opportunity to choose from a variety of sectors, 
structures and credit-quality characteristics to meet ones investment objectives something 
that the government bonds cannot offer. The variety is a result of the different types of 
corporate issuers that are available; utilities, transportation, industrial, financial services and 
conglomerates. As mentioned earlier they may be foreign firms including foreign 
governments as well. 
5. Marketability. As mentioned earlier, the corporate bond market is the largest bond sector 
therefore offers high liquidity. Thus if an investor must sell a bond before maturity, the 











1.3.2 Emerging markets 
Emerging markets have almost non-existent corporate bond exchanges though the OTe 
market is considerably large by an means. Thus accessing valuable and relevant information 
is a daunting task for one to effectively price and manage the risk exposures of the bond 
issues. Fortunately there are a few exceptions to this norm that have almost flourishing bond 
markets largely because they are well supported by the developed markets. For example 
Brazil, one of the emerging markets, is well supported by the US market. Most of the 
Brazilian issues are listed on the US exchanges and are dollar denominated. A look at a 
Brazilian firm with a particular rating and a corresponding bond issued by a US corporation 
will help to show the credit relationship ofthe emerging market corporate bond with the 
developed bond market debt issues. One of the major factors that contribute to the poor credit 
quality of emerging market issues is the risk inherent to the country in question. Political and 
currency risk are the main risks that determine a country's corporate credit quality. An article 
written by Marijke Zewuster (2002) for ABN AMRO that is summarised and discussed 
below attempts to contextualise emerging bond markets and the factors mentioned above 
which govern them. 
1.3.3 The Brazilian market 
During the period from 2000 to 2002, the Brazilian economy was able to withstand the 
economic crisis that hit Argentina, another emerging market. This was attributed to Brazil's 
then stable political climate. The firm actions carried out by the monetary authorities assured 
the stability and the extensive multilateral and bilateral support established by the 
government with established economies including US. The monetary authorities were able to 
transform the once extremely closed and inefficient economy into a more open and more 
market-oriented economy. Moreover, over this two-year period the government finally 
started to sort out the public finances, and despite disappointing economic growth it easily 
achieved the primary budget surpluses (i.e. excluding interest payments) agreed with the 
IMF. Even then, Brazil was not fully shielded from the global economic downturn 











owing to the Real's depreciation inflation rose from 6.0% in 2000 to 7.7% in December 
200 I. The lower growth and more favourable exchange rate did not prevent an increase in the 
current-account deficit over the same period from 4.1 % ofODP to 4.6%. Lower commodity 
prices and a reduction in world trade volume were the main reasons for a disappointing trade 
performance. A striking feature was that despite the unfavourable conditions for emerging 
markets, the inflow of foreign direct investment remained considerable and virtually covered 
the current-account deficit. 
After the 200 I downturn, early in 2002 the first signs of recovery became visible. The 
outlook for the export sector was encouraging, despite the loss of the Argentine market, and 
the trade balance was set to improve considerably. On the financial markets the fears of 
infection by the Argentine crisis had waned significantly. The interest-rate differentials 
between Brazilian long-term foreign debt papers and US paper with a similar maturity 
climbed beyond 1,000 basis points in 200 I, but since then they had fallen back again to 
around 700 early 2002. The Real, which depreciated steadily until October 2001, had since 
recovered appreciably. This is all more remarkable given that Brazil was to hold presidential 
and legislative elections later in 2002, which would have been a source of political risk 
(change of economic policies) from an investors' point of view. Fortunately, the 
government's presidential candidate, Jose Serra, who was then the minister of health, was 
widely expected to coast to victory, and this meant a continuation of the successful economic 
policies was guaranteed. In conclusion, the relationship between emerging markets and the 
developed markets greatly depends on the level ofpoliticaJ stability of the emerging market 
and its effect on the economic policies pursued. 
1.3.4 The South African bond market 
Like any other emerging market, South Africa has a bond market, BESA (Bond Exchange of 
South Africa) where both the primary and the secondary market is predominantly 
government issued securities (RSA bonds-Republic of SA bonds). Ninety percent (90%) of 
BESA turnover is in RSA bonds of which 34% is spot trades, 66% in repurchase agreements 
("Repo") and 0.25% is options exercised. Repos have had an important effect on the liquidity 











positions. Approximately 22% of BE SA trade is concluded with non-residents and another 
5% is traded offshore and settled through the South African settlement system (Allen Jones: 
2002). The RSA bond issues include the well-known R150, R153, and R157 treasury bonds 
as well as government backed issues such as Telkom bond (TKO I ). The more common RI 53 
is regarded, as the benchmark for all comparisons; in the last four years there has been an 
expressed intention to adopt the R157 as the next benchmark bond. It also has a few 
municipal issues such as the Umgeni Water Project (UG55). Corporate bonds are more 
popular on the Over-the-counter (OTC) market as much as the government bonds are on the 
bond exchange in terms of trading. Allen Jones (2002) summarised the proportion of BE SA 
held by each of the above mentioned bond issues according to their prospective sectors based 
on the sectors nominal values in issue as at October 2002. These nominal values are 
summarised below and graphically represented in Figure 3 below. 
Table 1: The BESA bond sectors in nominal value as at October 2002. 
Central Government R 330 656m 
Municipal Bonds 





Total in issue (Nominal) 
R 131m 
R380J5m 
R 17 519m 
R 27 356m 
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A briefsummary of notable events in the history of BE SA follows (Allen Jones: 2002), 
• 1987 Stals/Jacobs inquiry into financial markets recommended that either the 
participants or the Central Bank regulate the fragmented bond markets. The 
participants choose self-regulation and the Bond Market Association ("BMA") was 
formed. 
• Prior to 1989 - Institutions were subject to prescribed investments; therefore interest 
rates were kept at an artificial level. There was an active money market and an open 
market monetary policy; however, the bond market was fragmented and illiquid. In 
the later part of the 1980's Eskom started a market in its own bonds and the EI68 
bond became the benchmark (E 168' s yield was lower than the RSA bond yield). This 
lead Transnet and Telkom to start making markets in their own bonds. 
• 1990 - The National Treasury consolidates a number of smaller issues to create the 
R150 and R153 bonds. 
• 1991 - The South African Reserve Bank commences market making in government 
bonds. The RI50 bond replaces the E168 bond as the benchmark. 
• 1992 - The first corporate bond listed on BMA, issued by SA Breweries Limited. 
• 1996 - The BMA is formally licensed and becomes the Bond Exchange of South 
Africa ("BESA"). 
• 1997 - BESA moves to t+ 3 rolling settlement and achieves full compliance with G30 
"Recommendations for Clearing and Settlement", the first exchange in Africa to do 
so. The first Collateralised Debt Obligation listed (INCA BOND). 
• 1998 - National Treasury appoints 12 Primary Dealers to make a market in seven 
government bonds. The open outcry-trading floor closed as floor trading activity 
dwindles to less than 10% of total turnover. 
• 2000 - Members book all trades on new Bond Automated Trading System ("BATS"). 
BESA implements the Total Return Index ('TRI") with the All Bond Index ("ALB I") 
comprising 20 different bonds selected for their size and liquidity. Two sub-sections 
of the ALBI are the Government Bond Index ("GOVI") and the Other Bond Index 
("OTHI"). 80% of bonds listed are dematerialised. The first CPI-linked bond issued 











• 2001 - Corporate Bond market starts to take off. BE SA lists first mortgage-backed 
securitisation. The National Treasury introduces strip programme for: R 150, R 153, 
RI57, R186 and R194. The national Treasury implements 'Buy Back' programmes 
and switches. 
• 2002 BESA lists first receivable and credit swap synthetic securitisations and 
Index-linked contract. BESA issues new listing disclosure requirements and rules. 
The BESA members approve the BESA restructuring proposal. 
BESA has never had any liquidation default and no claim has been made on the Guarantee 
Fund in its history. BESA has never closed its market during market disruptions such as the 
October 1998 Russian and Asian problem or even the unprecedented September 11 tragedy. 
In February 2000 Standard and Poor's raised its foreign currency issuer credit rating on 
South Africa from double-B, that is, BB (See Appendix A.2 for definitions) to triple-B and 
its local currency issuer ratings to A from BBB. It also upgraded the ratings on South 
Africa's senior unsecured foreign and local currency debt to BBB and single-A-minus, 
respectively as a result of credible economic policy framework and sound economic 
fundamentals in the country. 
In summary, South African corporate bond investors face the same challenges faced by all 
the other emerging markets. Specifically, the corporate bond investors have to trade on an 
informal corporate bond market. 
1.4 Risks associated with investing in bonds 
1.4.1 Marketl Interest risk 
After the bond is issued the higher the market interest rates the lower the bond value/price, 
and vice-versa. The directional movement of interest rates resu Its in an opposite directional 
change in the price of bonds posing a risk of capital loss to an investor if interest rates 
increase. This is called market/interest risk. Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (J 992) model 
provides a process for interest rate risk modelling and risk management. The initial market 











in the bond price. The lower the coupon and the longer the term to maturity the higher the 
interest risk will be when market rates increase (the larger the capital loss). 
The inverse relationship between bonds and interest rates - that is, the fact that bonds are 
worth less when interest rates rise can be easily explained: when interest rates rise, new 
issues come to market with higher yields than older securities, making those older ones worth 
Jess. Hence, their prices go down. When interest rates decline, new bond issues come to 
market with lower yields than older securities, making those older, higher-yielding ones 
worth more. Hence, their prices go up. As a result, if you have to sell your bond before 
maturity, it may be worth more or less than amount you paid for it. 
1.4.2 Inflation risk 
Various economic forces affect the level and direction of interest rates in the economy. 
Interest rates typically climb when the economy is growing, and fall during economic 
downturns. Similarly, rising inflation leads to rising interest rates (although at some point, 
higher rates themselves become contributors to higher inflation), and moderating inflation 
leads to lower interest rates. Inflation is one ofthe most influential forces on interest rates. 
For all but floating rate bonds (unless if the coupon is inflation-indexed) an investor is 
exposed to inflation risk because the interest rate the issuer promises to make is fixed over 
the issue's life. 
1.4.3 Reinvestment risk 
As a bondholder, one is entitled to coupon payments. These interim cash flows will have to 
be invested at the prevailing market rate. Thus, the bondholder runs the risk of reinvesting 
these cash flow amounts at interest rates lower than those offered by the bond itself. In bond 
pricing, it is assumed that the coupon payments received by the bondholder are reinvested at 
the bond's yield to maturity and not the prevailing rates. In the real world this assumption is 
clearly flawed, the yield to maturity rate ofthe bond will always differ from the spot interest 











higher or lower than the bond's yield to maturity thereby presenting the holder with 
reinvestment risk. The impact of this risk on the bondholder depends primarily on the 
difference between the bond's yield to maturity and prevailing rate as well as the size of the 
coupon (the largerthe coupon the greater the resulting reinvestment risk). 
1.4.4 Currency risk 
Currency risk occurs when one holds an issue whose cash flows are denominated in a foreign 
currency. It is also commonly known as exchange rate risk. 
1.4.5 Call risk 
If the bond's indenture contains a "call" provision, the issuer retains the right to retire (that is, 
redeem) the debt, fully or partially, before the scheduled maturity date. For the issuer, the 
chief benefit of such a feature is that it permits the issuer to replace outstanding debt with a 
lower-interest-cost new issue. A call feature creates uncertainty as to whether the bond will 
remain outstanding until its maturity date. Investors risk losing a bond paying a higher rate of 
interest when rates have declined and issuers decide to call in their bonds. When a bond is 
called, the investor must usually reinvest in securities with lower yields. Calls also tend to 
limit the appreciation in a bond's price that could be expected when interest rates start to slip. 
Because a call feature puts the investor at a disadvantage, callable bonds carry higher yields 
than noncallable bonds, but higher yield alone is often not enough to induce investors to buy 
them. As further encouragement, the issuer often sets the call price (the price investors must 
be paid if their bonds are called) higher than the principal (face) value of the issue. The 
difference between the call price and principal is the call premium. 
Generally, bondholders do have some protection against calls. An example would be a bond 
that has a 1 O-year final maturity, not callable for the first two years. This means the investor 
is protected from a call for two years, after which time the issuer has the right to call the 
bonds. They can also demand sinking fund provisions with their issue. A sinking fund is 










maturity as specified in the indenture. If a bond issue has a sinking-fund provision, a certain 
portion of the issue must be retired each year. 
One investor benefit of a sinking fund is that it lowers the risk of default by reducing the 
amount of the corporation's outstanding debt over time. Another is that the fund provides 
price support to the issue, particu larly in a period of rising interest rates. However, the 
disadvantage - which usually weighs more heavily on investors' minds, especially in a 
falling-rate environment, is that bondholders may receive a sinking-fund call at a price (often 
par) that may be lower than the current market price of the bonds. 
1.4.6 Liquidity risk 
The ease with which one can sell an issue at or near its value is referred to as liquidity or 
marketability risk. The wider the spread between bid and ask price of an issue the more the 
liquidity risk and the less liquid the security is, and likewise, the narrower the spread the 
more liquid the issue is and the less the liquidity risk is. Treasury bonds have less liquidity 
risk than corporate bonds because there are more marketable (default free) and their market 
has depth. 
1.4. 7 Volatility risk 
Yolati lity risk is the risk that a change in vo latH ity ofinterest rates will affect the price of a 
bond adversely. 
1.4.8 DefaultlCredit risk 
Finally, default/credit risk is the risk that an issuer will be unable to make the contractual 
principal and interest payments (the risk of default by the issuer). The extent ofthe exposure 
to credit risk depends on the issuer and its credit rating or standing as by credit rating 
companies mentioned earlier.3 Credit risk of bond issues can be deduced from the Credit 
3 See Appendix A.I for an example of credit rating defmitions. Appendix A.2 shows the different symbols used by 











Spread, the yield spread between the corporate bond yield and its comparable Treasury bond 
(benchmark bond) yield. The government yield is the also known as the Treasury rate when 
the government borrows in its own currency. The spread profile can then define the different 
credit ratings for the different bonds as shown in the figure below. In the event of default the 
insufficient recovery of full debt is known as Recovery Risk. This is the market value for the 
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Figure 4: The corporate spreads for corporate bond issues of different credit ratings. The graph is 
obtained from Appendix B.3, which is a result of combining the graphs shown in Appendix B.2. See also 
Appendix B.1 for the data (the corporate bond yields for different credit ratings and their corresponding 
Treasury bond yields). The graph shows that the higher the credit rating (Aaa) the lower the yield spread and 
likewise, the lower the credit rating (Ba2) the higher the yield spread. 
In most instances, default risk and recovery risk are deemed to be one form of risk. In terms 
of definition, the two are separable because the former deals with the likelihood ofthe default 
event and not the loss incurred where the latter deals with the loss incurred only after the 
default event has occurred already. For this paper however, the two will be deemed as one 
such that the credit spreads used represent the difference in the probability of default and the 
size of recovery once in default between a risky corporate bond and a risk-free Treasury 











free rate plus an extra rate above it to compensate for the credit risk. Put differently, all other 
bond issues will trade at lower prices (at a discount to the price of the risk free government 
bond). This excess return required by investors to take on risky bonds is called the bond's 
Risk Premium. 4 Common sense tells us that the riskier the bond the greater the risk premium 
required, or the lower the price investors will be willing to buy the bond at. Thus, the risk 
premium required from an Aaa rated bond will be lower than that required on a Caa rated 
bond because the former is regarded to be less risky compared to the latter.5 
1.4.9 Price of risk using risk premiums 
Taking six corporations with bond issues in the United States that are classified in the four 
credit ratings shown and explained in Append ix A.I, the dollar price of risk was calculated. 
Assuming that U.S Treasury bond (T6.5) was the universal benchmark for these six corporate 
bond issues. Each bond issue's indenture was assumed to have the same bond features as the 
Treasury bond. That is, the maturity date, the settlement date, the coupon rate, the number of 
payments in a year (frequency), the principal amount (redemption), and the basis are the 
same for both the corporate bond and the benchmark Treasury bond. This leaves the yields as 
the only different variable between the two bond issues implying that it represented the 
difference in credit quality between them. The bond prices with the above features are then 
calculated using the formula, 
4 For example, on the 22nd of May 1998 ASH7.97 was trading at 6.261 % yield and T6 government bond 
was trading at 5.722% yield. Hence the Ash7.97 was offering a risk premium of 0.539% (6261- 5.722). 
5 As an example, on the 15th of May 1998 KFW 7.5 an Aaa rated bond was offering 6.095% yield and its 
benchmark was offering 5.748%. Therefore offering a risk premium of 0.347% (6.095- 5.753). On the same 
day, FGH4.5 a Caa rated bond was offering 7.483% and its benchmark was offering 5.748% resulting in a 











Bond price = Pv (settlement, maturity, rate,yield, redemption,/requency, basis) 
Bp =Pv (S, M, r, Y, R, F, Bl 
The right hand side of the equation represents the price per $100 tace value of the bond that 
pays periodic interest. In other words, Bp is present value function of S, M, r, Y, R, F, and B. 
As such, the difference between the KFW bond price and T6.5 bond price is the dollar value 
of the credit risk embedded in KFW corporate bond issue. Generally, taking P as the price of 
a corporate bond at time t, Pg as the price of the relevant Treasury bond at time t and the 
credit risk price Prisk is 
Prisk =Pg-P 
Also taking Yas the yield on a corporate bond at time t, y* as the yield on the relevant 
treasury at time t, and the yie Id spread as Y spread 
Yspread = Y - y* 
In our previous example our yield spread is 5.304 minus 4.55,0.754%. An example on 
calculating the dollar price of risk for a corporate bond using the above formula is shown in 
Appendix 8.4. 
6 KFW corporate bond at 30103/200 I with a yield of 5 .304% and T6.5 with a yield of 4.55% and both with 
the first settlement date 21/0411995. maturity 21104/2005, rate 0.075. redemption $100, frequency 2, and 











2. RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Having obtained the price of credit risk for the corporate bonds held, the paper now seeks to 
explore the options available to an investor to manage or control the credit risk exposure 
faced. This process of managing the risk exposure is known as Risk Management. It is a very 
complex process that requires not only high level oftechnical knowledge, but also a great 
understanding of the dynamics involved with the financial markets and their instruments. 
Fortunately, a breed of financial instruments sprung up in the late 1990s that made the risk 
management process less complex. These instruments are known as Derivatives. Risk 
management involving derivatives is mainly centred on the pricing and hedging of the 
derivatives used to control the risk exposure faced. 
This section starts off with a briefhistory on derivatives and their application in risk 
management processes. It is followed by examples of credit derivatives that an investor can 
engage in for the purpose of hedging their risky asset holdings. Then a brieflook at the 
classification of credit derivatives is given, as the pricing and hedging process that can be 
followed depends heavily on the credit derivative's classification. Examples of such 
attempted processes are also discussed in this subsection. The basic model that has been 
followed in the credit risk management process is summarised before the two chosen models 
are explored. The two models namely, the Jarrow & Turnbull model (JT model) and the Hull 
and White (HW model) are then discussed. For each model, a result summary of the pricing 
of credit derivatives (options & warrants) using the model and the corporate bond data 











2.2 Derivatives and Credit derivatives 
Derivatives are securities that can be generally defined as financial securities valued in 
reference to more basic underlying assets. The underlying assets are usually prices of traded 
assets, for example a stock option is a derivative depended on a particular stock/share price. 
In recent years, derivatives have become increasingly important in the world of finance 
(Hull: 2000). Derivatives grew in at least three dimensions. First, Futures and Options 
emerged as the building blocks for second and third generation derivatives that span complex 
hybrid, contingent, and path-dependent risks. They are the basic form of derivatives and the 
most common ones in practice. Second, new applications expanded use of derivatives 
beyond the specific management of price and event risk to the strategic management of 
portfolio risk, capital, balance sheet growth, shareholder value, and overall business 
performance. Finally, derivatives extended beyond the common underlying assets (interest 
rates, currencies, commodities, and equities) to new underlying risks including catastrophe, 
pollution, electricity, inflation, and credit (JP Morgan: 2000). 
Until recently, credit remained the major component of business risk for which no tailored 
risk management products existed. Credit risk management for the bond manager meant a 
strategy of portfolio diversification backed by line limits, with an occasional sale of positions 
in the secondary market. Users relied heavily on purchasing insurance, letters of credit, and 
guarantees and so on. These strategies proved inefficient, mainly because they failed to 
separate the management of credit risk from the asset with which that risk is associated. For 
example, consider a corporate bond, which represents a bundle of risk as explained earlier 
on, also including duration, convexity, calJability, and credit risk. ffthe only way to adjust 
credit risk is to buy or sell that bond, and consequently affect positioning across the entire 
bundle of risks, then surely the strategy avai lable is inefficient. 
The introduction of fixed income derivatives facilitated the management of risks such as 
duration, convexity, and callability independently of bond positions. Credit derivatives then 
completed the process by allowing independent management of credit risk. Credit derivatives 











instrument and transfer that risk between two parties. That is, they separate the ownership 
and management of credit risk from other aspects of ownership of financial assets. They can 
help investors and corporations manage the credit risk of their investments by insuring 
against adverse movements in credit quality of the borrower. 
If a borrower defaults, the investor (bondholder) will suffer losses on the investment but the 
losses can be fully or partially offset by the gains from the credit derivative. The reference 
entity, whose credit risk is being transferred, needs neither be a party to nor aware of a credit 
derivative transaction. They are the first mechanism via which short sales of credit 
instruments can be executed with any reasonable liquidity. Where it is impossible to short-
sell a bond/loan by synthetically purchasing credit protection using a credit derivative one 
can achieve the economics of a short position. Credit derivatives, except when in structured 
notes, are off-balance sheet instruments. 
2.2.1 Examples of credit derivatives 
1. Credit detGult swap. This is a contract where company X (protection buyer) has the right 
to sell a bond issued by company Y for its face value to company Z (protection seller) in the 
event that there is default on the bond. In return, company X makes periodic payments to 
company Z. In other words, it is an agreement in which a periodic fixed-rate payment, or up 
front fee, is exchanged for the promise of some specified payment(s) to be made only if a 
particular, predetermined credit event occurs. A credit event is defined as a default or a 
credit downgrade, where a default could include bankruptcy, insolvency, or failure to make 
payments within a predetermined amount oftime. A lowering of the credit by public rating 
agencies below a certain pre-specified level would constitute a downgrade. 
2. Total return swap. The return from one bond or a group of bonds is swapped for the return 
of another. Alternatively, it is a swap agreement in which the total return of a bank loan(s) or 
credit-sensitive security(s) is exchanged for some other cash flow, usually tied to LIBOR or 
some other loan(s) or credit-sensitive security(s). A total return swap can be considered a 
synthetic loan or security because while no principal amounts are exchanged and no physical 











underlying. The total return swap is distinctly different from a credit swap in that it 
exchanges the total economic performance of a specified asset for another fixed cash flow. 
The payments between the parties are based upon changes in the market valuation of a 
specific credit instrument, irrespective of whether a credit event has occurred. 
Another example would be a forward contract on a corporate bond (A swap where the cash 
flows from a corporate bond are paid and cash flow from a treasury instrument is received) 
and afutures contract on the spread between a corporate bond yield and the Treasury bond 
yield. 
3. Credit spread option. This is an option on the spread between yields earned on two assets. 
The option provides a payoff whenever the spread exceeds some level (the strike spread), 
meaning that the payoff of the option is linked to underlying credit spread or credit-sensitive 
asset price. That is, for example, an investor holding a corporate bond could buy an option 
that pays ofT whenever the corporate bond yield exceeds the Treasury bond yield by say 400 
basis points (4%). Typically the options are structured to knock-out (expire worthless) upon a 
default so that the economics of the instruments separate spread risk and default risk. 
4. A credit risk option (CRO). A CRO is an option where the writer agrees to compensate the 
buyer for a pre-determined and agreed fall or rise in the credit rating of a particular 
corporation. They are also known as Credit Rating Options. That is, they are financial 
instruments with payouts contingent upon a rating event (downgrade or upgrade). As 
explained earlier the fall in the credit rating (downgrade) is the lowering of the credit by 
public rating agencies. This could be for example the fall of a firm's credit rating from Baa 
(Investment grade) to Caa considered as a speCUlative rating. Note that the fall in credit 
quality subsequently results in a larger spread for the particular firm's debt issues. The 
pricing models for CROs must be of c lass that incorporate transitions between various 
ratings. Pricing models such as Das and Tufano (1996) create a risk neutral transition 












2.2.2 Classification of credit derivatives 
Credit derivatives can be classified on the basis of how their values are affected by the level 
of credit risk. 
I. The derivatives are issued by default-tree counterparlies on credit-risky 
underlying assets. For example, option on a corporate bond written by an Aaa 
company. 
2. The credit derivatives are issued by credit-risky counter parties on default-tree 
underlying assets whose values are not affected by the event of default by the 
writer. For example, if a Baa firm writes an option on a Treasury bond or index 
fund, the option would fall in this class of derivatives. 
3. Lastly, there are derivatives that have both levels of default risk where the 
derivative is issued on a credit-risky underlying asset by a credit-riSky 
counter party. In the options market, options that have both levels of credit risk are 
known as vulnerable options. 
Clearly, there is a great need to develop credit risk management tools that can manage both 
levels of credit risks simultaneously. Developing derivative pricing models that effectively 
incorporate the impact of both types of credit risks in their pricing process is one such 
effective way of managing these risks. There have been several attempts by people to 
develop models to that effect and many have fallen short of providing a practical and 
observable model that captures both risks. For example, Hull and White (1991) addresses a 
model that prices one type of the credit risk (vulnerable options' pricing) only whilst 
Litterman and Iben (1991) looks at the risk inherent in the underlying asset instead. This is 
mainly a result of the differences in the assumptions and set ups used in developing the 
models. For example, differing assumptions were made on the determination of the payoff 
ratio in default (others considered this as exogenously given while others took it as an 











Other models ignored the existence of credit risk and instead priced them as default free 
interest rate options (see Ho and Singer: I 984). This however, ignores the need for an 
arbitrage-free set up and also does ignore the existence of credit spreads (due to difference in 
credit quality) between Treasury default free bonds and the risky corporate bonds. Another 
problem inherent with some of these models is that they require valuation ofnon-tradable 
assets as part of the underlying asset pool as a model input. 
2.3 Tbe basic model requirements 
When analysing the effect of credit risk on the value of any financial instrument including 
derivatives the process can be divided into two stages. 
I. Estimating the expected loss (amount) in the event of a default. This greatly depends 
on the type of contract, the credit exposure and the chance of recovery in the event of 
default. 
2. Calculating the probability of default on the security. 
For example, analysing the impact of credit risk on the value of a loan, 
• 
• 
The expected loss in the event ofa default is the principal plus any accrued 
interest less any expected recovery (deduced from the past). 
The probability of default occurring can be determined using historical default 
rates provided by rating agencies. 
It is however, not that simple with derivatives where the exposure only occurs when the 
value of the contract is positive to the particular investor and negative to the counterparty. 
For example, an interest rate swap at inception has a zero value and there is no exposure to 
the counterparties but when interest rates move resulting in a positive value for the investor 
exposure occurs. The exposure on a derivative is considered as a payoff from an option on 
the derivative with a strike price of zero. It is also difficult to determine the relationship 
between the event of default and the credit exposure for derivative contracts. As previously 
suggested it is very easy to determine this relationship for loan contracts where the exposure 











on the derivative is relatively large when probability of default is high and the exposure is 
large, and it will be relatively small when the probability is low and the exposure is large. 
2.4 The Jarrow & Turnbull Model 
The above-mentioned model was presented by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and adapted for 
this paper as discussed in the following section. 
As the norm, we assumed the existance ofa frictionless, competitive and continuous trading 
economy where the investment horizon or trading horizon is 10, Tj. A frictionless trading 
market is assumed to have no transaction costs and trading barriers, a dream that the world 
will never get to realise. A competitive market from an economic perspective is the market 
where all trading participants are pure price takers; their individual trading does not affect the 
equilibrium price. Continuous trading market as the name suggests is a market where 
participants can continuously trade the portfolio components in order to adjust their 
portfolios accordingly. 
These assumptions made are somewhat far fetched for some markets. Transaction costs do 
exist, for example brokerage fees when an investor buys any financial security through the 
registered traders (Brokerage firm). Monopolies as well as oligopolies also do exist together 
within competitive markets. In the financial markets however, there is room to believe that 
there are very competitive markets where arbitrage opportunities exist far in between. If an 
arbitrage opportunity exists, the investors (traders) will all pounce on that profiteering chance 
forcing prices to adjust and consequently erasing the arbitrage opportunity. 
Continuous markets do exist but the extent or degree of continuity very much depends on the 
liquidity ofthe traded assets. As an example one could argue that the Treasury bond market 
is a more continuous market compared to the corporate bond market because the Treasuries 
are more liquid than cotporate bonds. The continuity is also greatly impeded by the fact that 
it takes time to execute a trade, the settlement date is usually plus or minus two days after the 











So taking the set of trading dates as discrete (O, 1,2,.., Tj or as continuous /0, 'fl, we assumed 
that there were three types of issuers whose issues were currently trading on the bond market. 
That is, the US government trading a default-free zero coupon Treasury bond (TB), a firm 
trading specific Moody's rating (Baal) risky zero coupon corporate bond XZY, and a second 
firm trading a trip le-A zero coupon corporate bond. These three zero coupon bonds were 
obtained by bootstrapping existing coupon bonds. The bonds used were specifically: 
a) the US Treasury maturing 15 May 2011 trading as US TREASURY (CATS) ZERO 
15 May 201 J. 
b) the risky zero coupon bond XYZ was obtained by bootstrapping a Baal Moody's 
rating General Motors Corporation 7.75% coupon bond maturing March 2036. 
c) the triple-A corporate bond used was trading as JNTL.BK.RECON & DEV (IRBD) 
ZERO 15 August 2003. 
We assumed that both the US Treasury bond and the triple-A corporate bond were the 
relevant benchmark bonds for the risky bond for modelling purposes. The argument in 
support of this assumption was the fact that options issued by and on triple-A firms are 
considered risk free according to the credit ratings definitions therefore the corresponding 
bond issued by the same firm would be deemed risk free. 
Letting po (t, T) denote the time t dol1ar value ofthe default free zero coupon bond that paid a 
definite dollar ($) at time T 2 t, for simplicity in our observations and analysis we assumed 
positive bond prices po (t, T) >0, and default free po (t, t) =1. Probability of default for these 
zero coupon bonds was therefore zero, that is, there was no chance of the Treasury bond 
defaulting because it had the full backing and the credit quality of the US government. On 
the same note, we let vJ(t, T) be the time t value of the XYZ zero-coupon bond promising a 
dollar ($) at date T 2t. Again we assumed the prices were positive at all times for simplicity 
i.e. vdt, T) >0. Note that our XYZ zero-coupon bond is a corporate bond that carries with it 
credit risk among other risks whose magnitude is dependent on the issuer's (General Motors 
Corporation) credit rating. It therefore promises to pay a dollar unlike the default free bond 
that pays a sure dollar at maturity. 
By using the default-free term structure, a money market account was developed. It invested 











over into the next one period bond. In other words, a dollar invested today t =0 in a one 
period bond gains the specific interest from this bond and this future value of the investment 
at t = 1 is invested in the next one period bond until maturity at t =2, and so on until the end 
of the trading horizon, T. Let B(t) represent the time t value of this money market investment. 
2.4.1 The Forex analogy 
The basic insight ofthe approach is to show that pricing options on risky debt is the same 
exercise as pricing options on foreign currencies. This argument follows that, because pricing 
the latter is well documented and understood if the similarities of the two pricing problems is 
established, pricing the former will consequently be easily solved. To demonstrate the 'Forex 
analogy', suppose that the XYZ zero coupon bond payoffs in Rand (R) and not in dollars ($). 
The introduction ofthe rand brings into play an exchange rate, el between the rand and the 
dollar (i.e. price of Rand in dollars ($IR». 
el (t) = VI(t, I) 
This is the time I dollar value of one promised Rand delivered at time I. In Rand, XYZ bond 
is of course default free. However, at maturity an XYZ promised dollar might not be worth 
an actual dollar. This occurs ifXYZ firm is in default and el (I) is less than 1. It follows then 
that ifXYZ firm is solvent e1 (I) is unity (one), and each promised Rand is actually worth a 
dollar. Letpi (I, T) be the time I price in Rand of an XYZ promised dollar delivered at time T 
for sure (Term structure of XYZ debt in Rand). 
From the above, the dollar value ofXYZ debt can be written as: 
vdl, T) =pJ(l, T) edt) 
The left hand side is the dollar value of a Rand (foreign currency) denominated bond. While 
the right hand side is the Rand value of a rand denominated bond mu ItipJied by the spot 











to pricing and hedging options on a rand denominated bond in dollars (The Forex Analogy). 
Here the spot exchange rate acts a payoff ratio when XYZ is in default. 
A two period economy is used to illustrate the foreign currency analogy as applied to credit 
risky options. The two-period economy is in discrete-time state and can easily be generalized 
to the continuous-time setting. The discrete-time setting results in trading dates t E {O,I, 2}. 
The default-free bond price process is assumed to be solely dependent on the spot interest 
rate. Thus, the current (t = 0) one period spot interest rate is 
r (0) = llpo (0, 1) 
In the "up-state," the one period spot rate is 
r (l)u = llpo(I, 2)u 
And in the "down-state" 
r (IJi= Ilpo(1, 2 Ji 
Probability of state u occurring is Noand the probability of state d occurring is 1 No. 
assuming that po (1, 2)11 <po (1, 2 h 
Let B(t) be the value of the Money Market Account at time t after investing a dollar at 
t = O. Note that, because we know the prevailing one period rate from the default-free zero-
coupon bond term structure B(t+I) is known at time t. 
:=> B(O) = I, (t = 0) 
After one period B(I) = B(O)r(O) B(I) =r(O) i.e. at trading date t = 1 
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Figure 5: The default-free zero-coupon bond price process for the two-period economy_ 
The figure shows the evolution of the spot interest rate process and the zero-coupon bond prices over the 
period 0, 1, and 2. Po (tf T) denotes the time t dollar value of the default free zero-coupon bond paying a sure 
dollar at time T. 
Harrison and Pliska, (1981) show that the no-arbitrage market condition is the existence of 
pseudo-probabilities 1l0. APo, and API such that po (t, 1)/ B(t), po (t, 1)/ B(t), VI (t, 1)/ B(t), 
VI (t, 2)/ B(t) are martingales. Market completeness is equivalent to the uniqueness of these 
probabilities and implies that any contingent claim against the securities can be synthetically 
constructed through trading in the primary securities. The probability 110 is determined in the 
default free bond market as mentioned above. 
From figure 5 above, 
po (0,2) =: (1lofJo(1, 2) u + (1- 1l0) po (1. 2) d} / r(O) 
Today's zero-coupon bond price is its next period's value discounted using 1l0. That is, the 
current bond price equals the discounted expected future value. 
Therefore 1lo, rearranging the above is given by 
110 {Po(1, 2 h- r(O)po (0, 2)J / {Po (1, 2)J- po (1. 2)u) 
Thus, 110 exists, is unique, and satisfies 0 < 110 < 1 if and on ly if 











Alternatively, the short-term zero-coupon bonds must not dominate long-term zero-coupon 
bonds, and that it earns more return in state d than in state u. Taking the zero coupon bond's 
default/no default state at time t, as b (default) and n (no default). 
Now for a credit risky zero-coupon bond at maturity, two states are possible i.e. default 
occurs, and default does not occur. If default occurs, the payoff is less than the face value of 
the bond. And if default does not occur, the payoffis exactly the same as the face value of 
the bond at maturity_ Assuming that the payoff per unit of face value is 5, in terms of the 
foreign currency analogy, the spot exchange rate at time 0 is unity, e(O)= 1 and at times 1 and 
1 eft) takes on the values as shown in Figure 6. 
1 
o 2 
Figure 6: The payoff ratio process for XYZ debt in the two-period economy_ The figure shows the 
binomial process followed by the payoff ratio for XYZ debt over the three periods. 
At time 1, with probability A,lIo,default occurs and the payoff is 60fthe face value. The 
payoff remains the same at time 1 because the XYZ will still be in default. Ifhowever, 
default does not occur at time 1 (1- A,lIo) the probability of default occurring at time 2 is 
given by ApI. 
Figure 7 below shows the stochastic movement of the XYZ bond denominated in Rand, it is 
similar to Figure 5 except that there are more states involved: the combinations ofthe 
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Figure 7: The XYZ zero-coupon bond price process for the two-period economy in XYZs. The figure 
presents the XYZ zero-coupon bond prices in XYZs (currency) in the two-period economy. 
Figure 8 below shows the XYZ bonds in dollars, a product of Figures 6 and 7, assuming that 
the spot interest rate process (Figure 5) and the default process (Figure 6) are independent 
under the pseudo-probabilities. The product results in the states combinations given by 
Giving API as 
vdl, 1)u,0= lipl (1, 1)".0= 6Ir(I)" (Up. default state) 
vdl.1)u, n= PI (1, 1)". n = {APlt5+ (1 - API){ Ir(1)" (Up. No default states) 
vdl, 1h,b= lipl (1, 1)d.b= t5lr(l)d (Down. default state) 




























Figure 8: The XYZ zero-c:oupon bond price process for the two-period economy in dollars. The figure 
shows the binomial process followed by the XYZ zero-coupon bond prices in dollars over the three periods. It is 
a product of the payoff ratio process and the XYZ zero-coupon bond price (in XYZs) process over the period. 
Which exists. is unique. and satisfies 0 < API < 1 if and only if 
1. PI (1, 2)u, b= lIr(1)u 
2. pdI,2h,b= Ilr(1h 
3. IiIr(l)u<PI (1, 2)u.n< 1Ir(1)u 
4. IiIr(l}d<pl (I, 2)tJ, n< Ilr(1)d 
5. r(1)uPJ (1, 2)u,n=r(1)dPI (1, 2h,n 
Where conditions, 
(1) and (2) show that in the state of default (b), the default-free bonds in dollars are equal 
to the XYZ bonds in Rand because the only uncertainty left is that of the default-free 
spot interest rates, (3) and (4) state that given no default at time 1, the dollar value for 
the XYZ bond must be less than the dollar value of a claim paying one dollar for sure 
and greater that a claim paying b'dollars for sure. (5) Guarantees the independence of 












Also from figure 8 we obtain, 
6. VI (0,1) = P J (0, 1) = /A}4J8 + (1 - A}4J)J I r(O) 
7. VI (0,2) = PI (0,2) = /mIA}4J) 8PI (1, 2)u, b + 7Io(1 - AJ.lo.}8pI (1, 2)u, n+ (1- 7IoJA}4J 8 
PI (1, 2h, b + (1 - 7Io)(l - ApoJPI (1, 2h, nJ I r(O) 
Again, the current prices are period one discounted expected values. Substituting conditions 
for 7Ioand API into (7) results in conditions: the dollar value ofXYZ bond maturing at period 
one must be worth less that receiving a sure dollar and greater than receiving 8 dollars for 
sure. XYZ bond maturing at period 2 must be worth more than receiving 8 dollars for sure 
and less than receiving r(1)dpl (1, 2JtJ. n dollars for certain. Also, the default process is 
independent ofthe defimlt-free spot interest rate process. 
Now let Crt) be the time t price of a European call option on the two-period XYZ zero-
coupon bond. Its value at expiration is 
C (1) = max /VI(1, 2) -X, OJ 
where X is the exercise price at time I. Using risk-neutral procedures the option's current 
value can be calculated as the discounted expectation of its time J payoff. 
That is, it's the sum (lfthe discounted expectation of its payoff at expiration in both the 
default and no-default states. Figure 7 shows that the XYZ bond process has four branches 
(combination ofthe up/down and default! no-default states), and consequently, to hedge an 
option three assets plus the money market are needed. That is, (l shares of the two-period 
XYZ zero coupon bond, 13 shares of the one period XYZ zero coupon bond, 'Y shares ofthe 
two-period default-free zero coupon bond, and lastly & shares of the money market 
investment to give 
aVl(1,2)U, b+ pVl(J,l)u,b + Wo(l, 2)u, b + &1'(0) = C(l)u, b 











aVJ(I,2h, b+ p Vl(1,Ih, b + Wo(1, 2)d, b + &r(O) = C(1)tI, b 
avJ(I,2h, n+ p Vl(1,Ih, n + Wo(1, 2h, n+ &r(O) = C(1)tI, n 
Maintaining the market completeness and no arbitrage conditions the call option's price is 
gIven 
C(O) = aVJ(0,2) + pavJ(O,I) + rpo(O, 2) + e 
This valuation process is used to price credit options by looking at the risk where the 
underlying asset (XYZ bond) may default. This can be extended or modified to include 
pricing vu Inerable options (the option writer defaulting). 
Assuming that like XYZ zero-coupon bond issuer, the writer ABC has zero-coupon bonds 
issued against its own assets with value vz(t, T) for T 2t and that they follow the same price 
process as the XYZ bonds. They have unique pseudo-probabilities that result in the relative 
prices of all these bonds to be martingales. The default process for the payoff ratio, ez(t) is 
independent of the default-free spot interest rate process and independent of the payoff ratio 
ofXYZ. 
Assuming that ABC instead ofXYZ writes the previous call option at maturity, the cash flow 
to the buyer represents a promise by ABC to make payment C(l) 
Thus, 
el(I)C(I) 
Cz(O) = Eo(ez(I)C(I)/ D(l) 
= Eo(ez(1)C(O) 
The price of the call option written by ABC is the price of a call option written by a default 











Cl(O) = I vJ(O,l)/ po(O,l)JC(O) 
The XYZ dollar bond price divided by the default free bond price equals the expected payoff 
to the credit risky bond at maturity. Therefore, a vulnerable option is therefore always less 
valuable than a non-vulnerable option (Cz(O) <CrOll because Ivz(O,l)/ Po(O,l)J < 1. 
In general, 
Cvft) = Iv[(t, T)/po(t, T)JC(t) 
where Cvft) is the time t value of a option written by a firm with risky debt or on a credit 
risky firm by a riskless writer (vJ(t,T)), and Crt) is the time t value of the same option written 
by an otherwise riskless writer or on a risk free debt. 
2.4.2 Results: Jarrow & Turnbull model 
The results ofusing the JT model presented below are broken into three different parts 
according to the bond inputs and the option inputs used. From the payoff result shown by the 
'forex analogy' process we expect to observe expected Baal option prices that are lower than 
their corresponding risk free option prices. That is, to attract investors into buying a risky 
option you would expect the option to sell at a lower price compared to a risk free option. On 
that same note, we therefore expect the expected Baal option obtained using the Treasury 
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Figure JT.l: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, a triple-A warrant and the 
JT model. The figure shows the expected Baal option prices obtained when using a triple-A warrant as the 
risk free option, using the Treasury zero coupon bond as well as the triple-A zero coupon corporate bond as 
the risk free debt over six months. 
A warrant issued by a triple-A finn (triple-A warrant) is used to represent a triple-A option 
(option written by an otherwise less risky writer or on a risk free debt). In this scenario no 
corresponding risky warrant was available to validate or compare with the expected risky 
warrant prices calculated using the IT model. This is as a result of the less liquid nature of 
warrants issued by risky finns and therefore very few active issues can be found in the 
market. As shown in the figure above, the expected Baal option prices resulting from the JT 
model using both the Treasury bond and the triple-A bond are lower than the corresponding 
prices for the risk free option used. For full details see Appendix IT. I 
An interesting result was obtained when we used coupon bonds as inputs instead of zero-
coupon bonds with the same tripJe-A warrant. The expected Baa I option prices using the 
Treasury bond were higher than the prices for the expected Baa 1 option obtained using the 
triple-A coupon corporate bond. This was expected but they were slightly higher than the risk 
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Figure JT.2: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, a triple-A warrant and the JT 
model. 
Obtaining more warrants proved difficult just as much as trying to get the options on bonds 
(bond options) from the market, even for the most liquid market, the US option market. The 
latter proved to be impossible mainly because most ifnot all bond options are traded over-
the-counter and therefore there is no ready and well-updated database to extract the prices 
from. Unfortunately, these bond options are the most ideal options used with the IT model 
because the bond option used would be the one ranking equally with the bond issue used. 
To overcome that hurdle, this paper looked at calculating these bond options using the bond 
issues that were readily obtained from the bond market and using option pricing models. 
To calculate the bond options, Black-Scholes model's special case model the Black Model 
was used (Black: 1976). Of note is that the volatility used in the Black model is the implied 
volatility calculated using historical bond prices, where in this paper the historical prices 
used are then used as the current bond prices for the JT model. The bond option calculated is 
a six month option on the US Treasury bond, triple-A corporate bond and finally on a Baal 
corporate bond for both zero coupon and coupon bonds. In other words, the implied volatility 
is in actual fact the volatility ofthe bonds over the six-month period. For the bond 












The six month bond option on Treasury bond calculated using the Black model had a price 
distribution which was higher than for the expected Baal option from the JT model. 
However, as shown in the figure below the option prices did move or fluctuate 
correspondingly over the six months. This is a result that was closely shared when we used 
the six month bond option on the triple-A zero-coupon corporate bond calculated using the 
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Figure JT.3: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, bond options using the 30-
year Treasury bond yield and the JT model. This shows the expected Baal option prices obtained from the 
JT model using as inputs the six month bond options calculated using the Black model together with zero 
coupon bonds for the US Treasury bond and the Baal corporate bond. To calculate the six-month bond options 
using the Black model, the 30-year Treasury bond yield was used as the risk free rate in determining the 
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Figure JT.4: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, bond options using the 30-year 
Treasury bond yield and the JT model. 
For the above two figures when calculating the bond option prices using the Black model, the 
discounting rate used is the sum of the 30-year US Treasury bond yield and the average risk 
premium for a 30-year trip le-A corporate bond, or for a 30-year Baal bond. The risk 
premium was the average risk premium (basis points above the Treasury bond) for 30-year 
corporate bonds issued under banks, industrials, transportation, utilities, and financials in the 
US corporate sector. 7 We then looked at using the same bond inputs as for the above results 
but changing the discount rate used in the Black model calculations. It is the sum of the 
average risk premium of the corporate bonds and the 6-month Treasury biJl rate and not the 
30-year US Treasury bond yield. This is arguably the better risk free rate to use because it 
represents the same time horizon as the bond option being calculated. It is also argued that 
the short term Treasury debt is more risk free than the longer dated debt issues; hence it is 
preferred as the risk free rate in asset valuations. 
Figure JT.5 that has the same zero-coupon bond inputs as for figure JT.3 which shows the 
same results as figure JT.3. The movement and changes in the option prices over the six 
month period are identical. Similarly, figure JT.6 has corresponding results as figure ITA 
7 For example, a 30-year Baal bond has the following risk premiums for the above mentioned sectors 
respectively, 177,168,2] 8,1 36,202 basis points. This gives an average risk premium of] 80 basis points 
(1.8%) above the Treasury yield (5.1 7%). The discount rate used in the Black Model for a 4-month option 











whose only difference lies in the discount rate used in calculating the bond options using the 
Black model. Despite observing these same results in both scenarios the use of the Treasury 
bill yield as the risk free rate in calculating the discount rate to be used in the Black model is 
recommended. 
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Figure JT.S: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, bond options using the 6-
month Treasury bill rate and the JT model. The Black model bond options are calculated by using the 6-
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Figure JT.6: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, bond options using the 6-month 
Treasury bill rate and the JT model. 
Finally, we looked at the IT model using a Treasury note (T-Note) that was previously 
defined as a Treasury bond with a maturity often years or less and a corresponding coupon 











was calculated using the Black model and used as part of the inputs into the JT model. The 6-
month bond options were calculated using the same implied volatility concept as before and 
the discount rate used was the sum of the ] O-year Treasury note yield and the average risk 
premium for a IO year Baal corporate bond. See Appendix JT.7 for full details. 
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Figure JT.7: The expected Baal option prices using lo-year coupon bonds, bond options using the 
lO-year Treasury note yield, and the JT model. 
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6-month Treasury bill rate and the JT model. 
In both instances, that is, when we used the I O-year Treasury note yield or the 6-month 
Treasury bill rate, the results were the same. There was no difference between the risk free 











This indifference meant that the payoff of the Baal corporate bond used in the model was 
close to I, or the bond itselfwas close to being risk free issue. This is a result that is contrary 
to what one expects given the definition in terms of risk according to Moody" s ratings for a 
Baa I corporate bond. 
2.5 The Hull & White Model 
The Hull & White model discussed in this section was presented by Hull & White (1992). It 
is a model used to price derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk. Simply put, 
they define how to price derivatives on risky underlying assets taking account of their yield 
spreads or default probabilities. It aims to answer the question whether estimated yields on 
corporate bonds (those that exist and those still to be issued) can be used to provide credit-
adjusted quotes for derivatives. With any derivative, losses can only be incurred when the 
value of the derivative is positive to the financial institution and negative to the counterparty. 
This portrays an option-like function of the no default value. That is, max (V, 0), where V is 
the derivative's no-default value to the financial institution. For contracts such as long 
options, V is always positive and thus the exposure equals to V, unlike swaps and forward 
contracts. 
A bond XYZ is defined as ranking equally with an option ABC ifthe recovery made in the 
event ofa default as a proportion of the exposure is the same as the option. Assuming that 
two groups of variables affect the value ofa derivative security when default is possible: that 
is, 
• the variables affecting its value in a no-default world 
• the variables affecting the occurrence of defaults by the counterparty and the 
proportional recovery made in the event of a default. 
A simplitying assumption that makes practical use of the model feasible is that the first set of 
variables is independent of the second. The question of how realistic this assumption arises. 
The answer to it will be that the value ofthe contract under consideration has a negligible 











means that contract is a very small part ofthe counterparty's portfolio of assets and 
liabilities, or that the contract's risk is entirely hedged by the counterparty. 
The values that actually cause defaults are also assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables 
affecting the no-default value of the derivative security. In other words, the variables such as 
the market interest rate term structure the value of the underlying asset that affect the value of 
say a call option were independent from those variables that affect the value of the same 
option looking from the probability of default of the counterparty. Such variables include the 
likes oftotal assets and liabilities of the counterparty firm and their impact on default 
probability and the recovery made on securities like options issued by the same firm. 
From a pricing point of view this assumption will be difficult to accept given that pricing of 
any security involves taking into consideration all the available variables that affect the 
security in both the no-default world and where probability of default exists. However, as 
argued before if we take the security in question to be part of a large pool of securities that 
are held by the firm the impact of this particular security on the firm's portfolio becomes 
very small and consequently its impact on the firm's probability of default is also very small 
and can therefore be ignored. Thus we can separate the variables that affect the option or 
derivative from those that affects the firm as whole and its default probabilities. As a side 
note, it would be of great importance to see the validity of such an assumption probably by 
trying to isolate the individual variables that affect the option/derivative and those that affect 
the firm as whole and quantifY their impact on the value of those two. 
Suppose first that the option is European and matures in time T. Define F as the value of the 
option taking account of the possibility of defaults and F* as the value of a similar default-
free option (we assumed that both a European option on a triple-A corporate bond or on a 
Treasury bond is the default free). 
The relationship between F and F* is: 











where Yis the yield on a zero coupon bond issued by the counterparty ranking equally with 
the option in the event of a default and, y* is the yield on a similar default-free bond (both 
continuously compounded). 
As an example of the application of this formula, consider a two-year OTe option with a 
default-free value of$3. Suppose that it is estimated that the two-year zero coupon bond 
issued by the option writer and ranking equally with the option in the event of a default 
would yield] 50 basis points (J .5%) over the Treasuries. Default risk has the effect of 
reducing the option value by about 3% to $2.911 (3e [-(0015)2]). 
Before presenting the model's results, the different assumptions are highlighted and 
discussed in detail below. 
). Bond prices issued by the counterparty and ranking equally with the option are readily 
available. From experience, bond traders are able to model the price structures of non-
existent issues using the particular firm's financial information and issues issued by other 
firms that rank equally with the firm concerned. Therefore the problem of non-existent bond 
issues for the counterparty can be easily solved. However, the task at hand is not easy 
considering that these simulated zero coupon prices should be for issues that pay off the same 
proportion, as do options issued by the same firm. Using bond issues issued by other firms 
that rank equally with the finn whose bond prices are being modelled, one can assume that if 
two finns have the same rating then their bond issues will have the same rating ignoring the 
differences between the two firms profile. Thus the bond prices can be modelled from similar 
credit rated firms. 
Intuitively, there has to be an adjustment to the bond issue or the option so that their duration 
or term to maturity as well as their underlying assets has the same credit value for them to 
rank equally and thus pay the proportion when in default. For instance, bond issues have 
longer term to maturities compared to options (call/put) and their underlying assets may be 
different from the bond's underlying. The latter's underlying assets are usually the residual 
assets in the event of default or there can be secured assets (secured bonds) whereas the 











underlying asset. Assuming that the bonds are secured debts and that warrants are used as the 
call options ranking equally as the bond issues the above problem can somewhat be resolved. 
Warrants are discussed in more detail on page 53. 
2. There are Treasury deWulf-free zero coupon bonds and a specific credit rated firm's risky 
zero coupon corporate bonds currently trading in the market. As previously mentioned, for 
on-the-run Treasury bonds corresponding STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest 
and Principal of Securities) can easily be found in the market. Ifthey don't exist one can 
easily strip the existing on-the-run Treasury to form a portfolio of zeros consisting of the 
Treasury's periodic coupon payments and the face value of the issue. 
With the periodic coupon payments taken as principal amounts the periodic yield can be 
calculated. Consider a I O-year semi-annual paying Treasury, the resultant yields wilt be for 
periods: six months (period I), one year (period 2), one and half years (period 3) .... 10 years 
(period 20). This is further simplified by the fact that there exist a large market of Treasury 
bonds with very high liquidity profile and thus readily available bond prices. Unfortunately, 
the same cannot be said of corpor&te bonds let alone zero coupon corporate bonds due to 
their nature as explained previously. 
It is important that the Treasury zeros and the corporate zeros (referred to as zeros 
henceforth) have the same profile in terms of duration, term to maturity, and face value 
amount. These are vital requirements as they affect not only the prices of the zeros but their 
yield to maturity. Consequently, the accuracy of the yield spread between the two 
instruments is affected. An accurate yield spread will represent the precise difference in the 
credit worthiness of the Treasury zero and the corporate zero and the payoff of holding the 
risky corporate zero over the Treasury zero. 
What is interesting, as depicted in Appendix A.3 is the difference that exists for zeros issued 
by issuers in different market sectors. According to the graphs in Appendix A.3, the 
corporate spreads for Utilities, for example, are different to the spreads for the Banking 
sector yet the bond issues have the same credit rating and maturity. Another interesting 
observation is that for a corporate zero with a particular maturity, the corporate spreads tor 











specu lative issues (Caa). In other words, for a particu lar cred it rating the corresponding 
corporate spreads are different from one sector to another. This is probably so because the 
different sector issues use different Treasury benchmarks. Therefore one needs to be careful 
on the benchmark used. 
3. A triple-A European option is assumed to be a default free option. Considering that in the 
market a triple-A option is the highest credit rated option that exists this assumption should 
have no impact on the modeL After all, the calculated! expected prices for the risky option 
from the model mayor in fact, will not exist. Therefore holding the triple-A options, which 
are readily available, and the risky bond will create a portfolio that mimics the payoff of the 
expected risky option. 
In brief, the triple-A option is the ideal risk-free option and furthermore ifit has a risk-free 
asset as the underlying it becomes a risk free vulnerable option. The risk free underlying 
asset could be an interest rate index, a Treasury security etc. What are the chances of getting 
the above ideal option whose maturity, duration matches that of the risky and risk free zeros 
the other inputs in the model? The market seems to suggest that the chances of getting such 
an ideal option are rare, if at all there is ever a chance. One way to overcome that would be to 
use warrants in place of normal European options. They are readily available compared to 
normal European options and thus will be easier to find and use. Ignoring the difference in 
maturity and duration between the zeros and the warrants they can be used as inputs for the 
models above using time-series data. 
Warrants are special call options differing from the ordinary option in terms of their 
embedded relationship between writer and the underlying stock. A warrant is a call option 
written by a firm with the firm's own common stock has the underlying asset. This allows the 
assumption that the credit rating ofthe warrant will be the same as the credit rating of the 
issuing firm. Hence, they can be valued as vulnerable options. They are often issued as 












There are two main warrant features that clearly distinguish them from normal traded 
options, 
• they have a longer life, five to ten years at issue compared to traded call options that 
have anything from one month to two years, 
• on their exercise the writing firm must issue new shares, resulting in a holdings 
dilution for existing shareholders and cash inflow to the firm. 
Unlike, with ordinary call options there is no cash inflow or shareholding dilution to the firm 
because the contract is between investors with the underlying asset/firm not taking part in the 
contract. Dilution occurs iffor example, the initial shares outstanding was 50 and upon a 
warrant's exercise the writing firm issued 15 new shares, new outstanding shares would then 
be 65. In this case, initially the existing shareholders had lI50 claim on the firm, now after 
issuing new shares they own only 1/65 of the revised company shareholdings. 
When warrants are issued as attachments to other security issues they act as 'sweeteners', 
they provide the issuing firm with a cheaper source of capital or in other cases they solve a 
problem that normal debt/equity issue alone cannot solve. They are separated and traded on 
their own as soon as the security to which they will attach to is issued. They are more liquid 
compared to call options; because call options are short term investors consider them as 
'speculative securities' thus they opt to buy more of the long-term issues. 
As warrants are long term call options, they can be valued using the Black-Scholes model 
allowing for a few alterations to the inputs. Dividends are deducted, that is, the usual S in the 
model is replaced by S exp(-Jt). The expected average long-term volatility is used to 
compensate the long warrant life. As previously mentioned, warrant exercise results in share 
dilution, that is, more shares are issued and the share price taIls. Galai and Schneller (1978) 
showed that the resultant fall in share price when a warrant is exercised should be taken into 
account when the warrant is valued. In short, Schulz and Trautmann (1990) showed that 
valuing a warrant as a long-term call option, based upon the share price (modified for 
dividends) and totally ignoring dilution when using Black-Scholes model is not totally 











years or less) and not yet in-the-money. Not surprisingly, practitioners currently value 
warrants that way. 
To tie in with the HW model assumption that the derivative usedlcalculated always has 
positive value, warrants never have negative values. Therefore their exposure is always the 
no-default value at any time during the warrant's trading life. A warrant is always worth at 
least, the value of the common stock minus the warrant's exercise price, its intrinsic value. 
At expiration, the warrant is either equal to its intrinsic value or zero (when it has no positive 
value to the holder, no exercise occurs). 
4. The default-free bond price process is assumed to solekdgpend on the spot interestrate. 
There is a negative or inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates. That is, 
bond prices decrease as market interest rates rise and vice-versa. Therefore the only variable 
that causes a change in price and the direction ofthe change is the spot rate (the current or 
prevailing short-term interest rate). The magnitude and direction of the change depends 
heavily on the size of interest rate movement, that is, a movement of 100 (1 %) basis points 
will result in a different magnitude in the bond price change compared to a movement of300 
(3%) basis points. 
2.5.1 Results: Hull & White model 
The results of using the HW model presented below are also broken into different parts 
according to their bond and option inputs as explained earlier for the JT model. For full 
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Figure HW.I: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, a triple-A warrant and the 
HW model. This figure shows the expected Baal option priCes obtained when using a triple-A warrant as the 
risk free option, using the Treasury zero coupon bond as well as the triple-A zero coupon corporate bond as 
the risk free debt over six months. 
As observed on the JT model results for the same bond and option inputs, the triple-A 
warrant prices are higher than the expected Baal option prices obtained from the HW model 
using both the triple-A corporate bond and the Treasury bond. The relationship between the 
two expected Baal options prices is mixed, with the expected Baal option prices using the 
triple-A bond being higher than the expected Baal option prices using the Treasury bond. 
Suggesting that at those times the triple-A corporate bond was less risk compared to the 
Treasury bond. 
For the coupon bond inputs and the triple-A warrant the results confirmed the relationship 
between the triple-A warrant prices and the expected Baal option prices. Of note was that the 
two expected Baal option prices were the same suggesting that the two coupon bonds used 
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Figure HW.2: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, a triple-A warrant and the HW 
model. 
The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon Treasury bond and zero-coupon Baal 
corporate bond as well as using the 30-year Treasury bond as the risk free rate in the Black 
model were lower than the correspond ing risk free option prices. The two prices converged at 
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Figure HW.3: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, bond options using the 
30-year Treasury bond yield and the HW model. The figure shows the expected Baal option prices 
obtained from the HW model using as inputs the six month bond options calculated using the Black model 
together with zero coupon bonds for the US Treasury bond and the Baal corporate bond . The Black model 
used the 30-year Treasury bond yield as the risk free rate in determining the discount rate used to calculate 
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Figure HW.4: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, bond options using the 30-year 
Treasury bond yield and the HW model. This shows similar results to figure HW.3, with a convergence in 
the two option prices at maturity. The Black model used the 30-year Treasury bond yield as the risk free rate 
in determining the discount rate used to calculate the six month bond options. 
Figure HW.5 and HW.6 below are derived as the above two figures respectively, except that 
the discount rate used in the Black model is the sum ofthe average risk premium ofthe 
corporate bonds and the 6 month Treasury bill rate. As in the case of the JT model, the 
results obtained are exactly the same as those obtained when the Black model used the 30-
year Treasury bond yield as the risk free rate. This is shown below. 
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Figure HW.S: The expected Baal option prices using zero-coupon bonds, bond options using the 6-
month Treasury bill rate and the HW model. The Black model bond options are calculated by using the 6-
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Figure HW.6: The expected Baal option prices using coupon bonds, bond options using the 6-
month Treasury bill rate and the HW model. The Black model bond options are calculated by using the 6-
month Treasury bill rate as the risk free rate in determining the discount rate to be used. 
Likewise, when we used the I O-year Treasury note yield or the 6-month Treasury bill rate, 
the results were the same for the HW model as for the JT model. There was no significant 
difference between the risk free option and the risky option prices. This indifference means 
that the payoff of the Baa I corporate bond used in the model was close to I , or the bond 
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Figure HW.7: The expected Baal option prices using la-year coupon bonds, bond options using the 
IO-year Treasury note yield, and the HW model. The expected Baal option prices observed are equal to 
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Figure HW.8: The expected Baal option prices using lO-year coupon bonds, bond options using the 
6-month Treasury bill rate and the HW model. As in figure HW.7 the two option prices observed are equal 











3. COMPARISON OF THE TWO MODELS AND CONCLUSION 
3.1 Introduction 
The individual model results discussed above are combined to facilitate a comparison 
between the Jarrow & Turnbull and the Hull & White model results when used with the same 
bond inputs and option inputs. The results are shown diagrammatically with a brief summary 
on the inputs used to obtain the results. This is folJowed by an analysis on the model results. 
The analysis model used for the comparison is the volatility analysis. The volatility analysis 
is carried out by constructing a portfolio consisting of the "expected options" together with 
the actual warrants and in the other case, the Black model expected bond option prices. The 
section ends with a conclusion deduced from the model results and a summary of the whole 
paper. 
3.2 Results 
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Figure R.I: Comparison of the expected Baal option prices obtained using the JT model vs. the HW 
model, with zero coupon bonds, or coupon bonds, and the triple-A warrant as inputs. For all the 
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Figure R.2: Comparison of the expected Baal option prices using the lT model vs. the HW model, 
with zero coupon bonds, the bond options from Black model using the 30-year Treasury bond yield 
as the risk free rate. The calculated Baal price is from the Black model with the 30-year Treasury bond yield 
as the risk free rate. The two models do not produce the same expected Baal option prices when using both 
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Figure R.3: Comparison of the expected Baal option prices using the lT model vs. the HW model, 
with zero coupon bonds, the bond options from Black model using the 6-month Treasury bill rate as 
the risk free rate. The calculated Baal price is from the Black model with the 6-month Treasury bill rate as 
the risk free rate. The expected Baal option prices are different for the two models. 
All three figures show clearly that the IT model and the HW model produce expected Baal 











them to be the same or at most slightly different given that the same inputs are used in either 
model. The probable reason for such big differences between the two models ' results .lies in 
the degree to which each model is sensitive to the adjustments and Black model calculations 
carried out on the inputs. 
In spite ofthe above results, different results were observed when the 10 year coupon bond 
inputs were used. The risk free option (option on the I O-year Treasury bond) was calculated 
from the Black model using the lO-year Treasury bond yield or the 6-month Treasury bill 
rate as the risk free rate. The results shown in figure below show that the expected Baal 
option prices for both the JT model and the HW model were considerably the same but 
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Figure R.4: Comparison of the expected Baal option prices using the JT model vs. the HW model, 
with lO-year coupon bonds, the bond options from Black model using the 30-year Treasury bond 
yield and the 6-month Treasury bill rate as the risk free rate. The calculated Baal price is also from the 
Black model with the 30-year Treasury bond yield and the 6-month Treasury bill rate as the risk free rate. 
For in-depth comparison of the above results we explored the use of volatility analysis. This 
analysis was carried out to see whether there was any meaningful relationship in the price 
movement (price change) in the calculated and expected Baal options. Any such meaningful 
relationship would help ascertain that one could still price and hedge their security holdings 












Volatility, 0', is the measure of the uncertainty ofthe return realised on an asset. It can also be 
defined as the standard deviation of the asset's return in one year when the retum is 
continuously compounded. Note that it is also the standard deviation of the natural logarithm 
of the asset's price at the end of one year. Using historical price data one can produce 
estimates of current levels of volatilities and correlations, as well as forecasts of the future 
prices. The volatilities are modelled using the Value-at-risk, VaR, which is defined as the 
minimum expected loss with a I % confidence level for a given time horizon (usually I or 10 
days) calculation process (Hull 2000). 
3.3.1 Estimating volatility using historical data 
Observing the asset's price daily define: 
• n + 1 as the number of observations 
• Si as the asset price at the end of ith interval 0, 1, 2, .......... , n), where the 
intervals of time in our case is daily closing prices. 
• T as the length of time interval in years 
Let, 
(1) 
for i= 1,2,3, ........ ,n. 
That is Ui is the continuously compounded return in the ith interval. Using s, the standard 
deviation of the u;'s which is given by 0' /(T/ 5 it follows that given sand T, 0', the volatility 
per annum of the asset can be easily estimated. Empirical research shows that only trading 
days are used in volatility calculations (Fama: 1965 and French: 1980). That is, non-trading 
days are ignored and thus a year has 252 days (trading days). In words, the volatility 0' per 
annum is the product of the volatility per trading day s and the square root of the number of 











For daily volatilities, let (In be the volatility of a market variable (e.g option price, bond price) 
on day n. estimated at n-J, and let rln be the variance rate on day n. 
It follows that, 
(2) 
a is the average ofthe u/s and a:: (Un-i ai) is the sum of all deviation squared of m 
observed daily returns from their mean. 
As mentioned earlier, to analyse our model predicted option prices versus the actual option 
market prices we aim to look at the relationship of their volatilities over time. Assuming we 
hold a hypothetical portfolio consisting of an option whose prices are model-determined and 
another option whose prices are the actual market prices (Black-Scholes prices) one can use 
the volatility modelling used for VaR calculations. Hence the above equation is adjusted to 
accommodate VaR calculation, 
(3) 
Ui is now the proportionate change in the asset price, the mean of u;'s is assumed to be equal 
to zero and m -1 is replaced by m and all u2 /s are given equal weightings (Hull: 2000). 
3.3.2 GARCH (1, J) Model 
(4) 
rl n is calculated from a long run average variance rate, V, with a weighting '/, 
u2 n _I, with weighting a, and rl n -I, with a weighting p. The sum ofthe weightings is equal 
to one. In words, rln is determined by the recent u2s and the most recent variance rate 
estimate. 













To calculate or to estimate the parameters, lIJ, a, and p the Maximum Likelihood Method is 
used. It estimates the parameter values that maximises the likelihood of the data occurring. 
Letting Vj= uZ; be the variance rate for day i, estimating the parameters iteratively requires 
maximising the expression 
(J) 
where i, ranges from 1,2,3, ..... , m. This is known as the Likelihood measure. 
Using Solver in Microsoft Excel to estimate the optimal parameters in the GARCH (1, I) by 
maximising the above expression the following constraintslconditions for the parameters are 
used. The tong run variance rate, V, is equal to the sample variance (Variance Targeting). 
From variance targeting, lIJ lV = V(J - a - p) 
]+a+p;lor (V/lIJ}+a+p 1 
a +p<=J 
a <= 1 - p, P <= J a 
], a, P => 0 
,), a,p<= 1 
Please note that only parameters a, p are estimated using the above constraints. Using the 
values of V; (i;, variance rate for day i, resulting from the optimal parameters the daily 
volatility is computed as the square root of the variance rate for that particular day. 
In both Figure G.l zeros and Figure G.l coupons, the volatilities of the expected Baa 1 option 
prices using both the JT and HW model as well as using the Treasury bond and the triple-A 
cotporate bond as the reference bonds and a triple-A warrant as the risk free option are 
shown below. For full details of Figure G.t zeros see Appendix GARCH (1,1) zeros that 
shows the volatility calculations for the expected Baa 1 options prices obtained using HW 
model and the triple-A zero coupon corporate bond as the risk free bond. Likewise, for the 
full details pertaining to Figure G.t coupons see Appendix GARCH (1,1) coupons that show 
the volatility calculations for the expected Baal option prices using the JT model and using 
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Figure G.la zeros: The daily volatilities of the HW model and the JT model prices using zero coupon 
Treasury bond and zero coupon corporate bond. The figure is a Line Chart that displays the volatility 
trend over time. The figure shows that the peaks and troughs of the daily volatilities occur at the same time 
periods but differ in magnitude for the two models. 
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Figure G.lb zeros: The daily volatilities of the HW model and the JT model prices using zero coupon 
Treasury bond and zero coupon corporate bond. The figure above is a Stacked Line Chart that is 
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Figure G.lb coupons: The daily volatilities of the HW model and the JT model prices using coupon 
Treasury bond and coupon corporate bond. This figure is a Line Chart that displays the volatility trend 
over time. 
In Figure G.t coupons and Figure G.1 zeros, all the volatilities of the model prices have their 
peaks and troughs exactly like the triple-A option with the difference only appearing in the 
magnirude of those troughs and peaks. This should be expected considering that the models 
are detenninistic and therefore greatly dependent on the reference risk free option used. The 











used. For each of the above figures, the corresponding Appendix for their GARCH model 
volatilities is presented with the answer report, sensitivity report and a limits report. These 
reports are just a summary ofthe parameters and their characteristics used in the iterative 
process to calculate or model the daily volatilities. 
3.4 Conclusion 
From the results shown above, clearly the two models failed to price the expected risky 
option price given the bond inputs and the risk free option or warrant. This is greatly 
attributed to the characteristics or nature of these vital inputs used. A brief statistical look at 
the bond inputs used confirmed that the predictive failure of the two models was indeed as a 
result of the bond inputs' nature (See table 2 & 3 below). 
In Table 2 & 3 the summary shows that the bond prices and yields used did not follow a 
normal distribution series, mainly because the skewness and kurtosis needed for a normal 
distribution were not achieved by any of these bond inputs. 8 The bond options calculated 
using the Black model requires the bond input prices to be normally distributed and also the 
two models 1T and HW assume normal distribution in the bond prices and the option prices 
used and obtained. The reason being that if you use normally distributed variables the 
resultant product will also assume normal distribution. 
In other words, because of the non-normality in the bond inputs used, the bond option prices 
calculated using the Black model would be inaccurate. Consequently, explaining the mixed 
results observed in the expected Baa I option prices from the JT and the HW modeL 
8 Nonnal distribution series requires that the prices exhibit a skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of3. The furmer 
meaning that the distribution is symmetrical about the mean and the latter means the distribution has a 











Henceforth, it was concluded that for the JT and HW models to work, or accurately predict or 
price the risky options the following conditions must be met. 
These inputs must 
• be normally distributed 
• have corresponding maturities as well as the other bond features such as the coupon size. 
• be of issues in the same sector, as shown by the Reuters tables that the risk premium 
required for bond issues of the same rating but from different sectors are different. 
• on-the-run Treasury issues must be used because they provide the most liquidity (they 
are highly traded); therefore they are the best risk free bonds to use. 
• as previously mentioned, it is difficult to get such perfectly corresponding bond issues 
and options to use in the mode Is in order to predict a risky option's price. Therefore it 
will be necessary and important to investigate methods that can be used in practise to 












3.4.1 Bond inputs summary 
A statistical summary was done for the normal bond price and yield, and their corresponding 
Jog values. Same results are observed for the log of the prices and yields as in the normal 
case. 
Table 2: The statistical summary for coupon bonds for both their normal prices and their log prices 
Descriptive Statistics (Normal market prices) 
BAA 1 BAA1Y TB TBY 
Mean 102.63170 6.37103 101.38250 4.81611 
Median 102.35000 6.40900 100.81250 4.88600 
Max 105.88000 6.70600 10621880 5.21300 
Min 100.29000 5.92600 98.46875 4.18200 
SD 1.10200 0.15821 1.87293 0.24879 
Skewness 0.97374 -0.98171 0.66114 -0.61931 
Kurtosis 3.78258 3.72438 2.69332 2.64118 
Jarque-Bera 22.20895 22.08137 9.28910 8.38385 
Prob 0.00002 0.00002 0.00961 0.01512 
Sum 12418.44000 770.89500 12267.28000 582.74900 
SumsqDev 145.72890 3.00346 420.94540 7.42753 
Observations 121 121 121 121 
Descriptive Statistks (Log prices) 
LnBAA1 LNBAA1Y LnTB LnTBY 
Mean 4.63109 1.85145 4.61873 1.57061 
Median 4.62840 1.85770 4.61326 1.58637 
Max 4.66231 1.90300 4.66550 1.65116 
Min 4.60807 1.77935 4.58974 1.43079 
SD 0.01068 0.02516 0.01837 0.05263 
Skewness 0.94447 -1.D4n8 0.62688 -0.71996 
Kurtosis 3.72570 3.85484 2.63646 2.81639 
Jarque-Bera 20.64425 25.82410 8.59131 10.62315 
Prob 0.00003 0.00000 0.01363 0.00493 
Sum 560.36190 224.02550 558.86660 190.04380 
SumsqDev 0.01370 0.07594 0.04049 0.33241 











Table 3: The statistical summary for zero-coupon bonds for both their normal prices and their log 
prices 
Descriptive Statistics (Normal market prices) 
AAA AAAY BAA 1 BAA1Y TB TBY 
Mean 98.48131 2.11399 33.61028 3.20719 82.12702 2.08773 
Median 98.43800 2.10810 33.62900 3.19790 82.29600 2.07230 
Max 99.00300 2.44250 37.51700 3.59270 84.36200 2.36090 
Min 97.90400 1.92080 29.30100 2.85910 79.65600 1.79580 
SD 0.29492 0.09401 1.79044 0.15780 1.05585 0.12816 
Skewness 0.16068 0.86118 0.00265 -0.01004 -0.31530 .0.13176 
Kurtosis 1.80579 4.38713 2.47119 2.57745 2.90074 2.64783 
Jarque.Bera 7.71082 24.65691 1.41001 0.90221 2.05447 0.97543 
Prob 0.02117 0.00000 0.49411 0.63692 0.35800 0.97543 
Sum 11916.24000 255.79310 4066.84400 388.06990 9937.37000 252.61490 
SumsqDev 10.43704 1.06055 384.68060 2.98824 133.77910 1.97101 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Descriptive Statistics (Log prices) 
Ln 
LnAAA LnAAAY LnBAA1 BAA1Y LnTB Ln TBY 
Mean 4.58986 0.74762 3.51342 1.16419 4.40819 0.73419 
Median 4.58943 0.74579 3.51539 1.16249 4.41032 0.72860 
Max 4.59515 0.89302 3.62479 1.27890 4.43512 0.85904 
Min 4.58399 0.65274 3.37762 1.05051 4.37772 0.58545 
SD 0.00299 0.04377 0.05342 0.04934 0.01289 0.06189 
Skewness 0.15719 0.69488 .0.11563 -0.12609 -0.34980 -0.28447 
Kurtosis 1.80569 3.95930 2.50653 2.59078 2.90942 2.75090 
Jarque.Bera 7.68965 14.37737 1.49737 1.16487 2.50903 1.94484 
Prob 0.02139 0.00076 0.47299 0.55854 0.28522 0.37817 
Sum 555.37330 90.46187 425.12380 140.86700 533.39040 88.83668 
SumsqDev 0.00108 0.22987 0.34243 0.29214 0.01992 0.45966 
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Moody~s Investors Service 
Issuer ratings 
Foreign currency: Moody' foreign currency ratings are opinions ofthe ability of entities to 
honour senior unsecured financial obligations and contracts denominated in foreign currency. 
Domestic currency: Moody's ratings are opinions ofthe ability of entities to honour senior 
unsecured financial obligations and contracts denominated in their domestic currency. 
Derivative Product Companies: Issuer ratings that are assigned to derivative product 
. companies are opinions of the financial capacity of an obligor to honour its senior obligations 
under financial contracts, give the appropriate documentation and authorisations. 
Four class ratings as per Moody's Investors Services are explained and examples of firms for 
each class are also given in table below. 
Aaa. The counterparties offer exceptional financial security and have the lowest degree of 
risk. While the financial strength ofthese entities may change, such changes as can be 
visualized are most unlikely to impair the entities' strong position (e.g. KFW International 
Finance and General Electric). 
Baa. The counterparties offer adequate financial security. However, certain protective 
elements may be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over any great period of time 
(e.g. Diamond Shamrock and Ashland Inc). 
Ba. The counterparties offer questionable financial security. Often the ability of these 
entities to meet their contractual obligations may be uncertain and thereby not well 
safeguarded in the future (e.g. American Standard and Hollinger Pub) . 
. Caa. The counterparties offer very poor financial security. Such counterparties may be in 
default, or there may be present elements of danger with regard to financial capacity (e.g. 













Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, Fitch IBCA, Duff & Phelps 
I Credit rating. Moody's Standard and Poor's Fitch IBCA, Duff & 
Phelps 
I Investment Grade 
Highest quality Aaa AAA 
---~--~---~--------~--.-~~.-. 
High quality (very strong) i Aa 
I Upper medium grade (strong) A A 
Medium grade Baa BBB BBB 
.~.~-.--.. ~. - .. _-.--
Speculative bonds 
Lower medium grade Ba BB BB 
(Somewhat speculative) 















Reuters corporate spreads for Banks 
Ratings Maturity 
tyr 2yr Jyr 3yr 7yr tOyr JOyr 
Aaa/AAA 16 19 30 33 48 60 80 
AallAA+ 25 34 35 42 58 71 91 
Aa2/AA 27 40 42 46 61 73 94 
Ad/AA- 29 43 44 51 65 77 103 
AlIA+ 53 59 63 66 81 95 118 
A2/A 56 62 65 68 82 97 122 
A3/A- 60 65 68 72 86 100 123 
BaatIBBB+ 73 84 92 97 129 151 177 
Baa2/BBB 76 92 100 104 134 157 182 
Baa3/BBB- 83 97 105 108 139 164 187 
BaIlBB+ 565 575 585 595 615 635 655 
Ba2IBB 575 585 595 605 625 645 665 
Ral/BB- 585 595 605 615 635 655 675 
B1IB+ 735 745 755 785 825 865 915 
B2/B 745 755 765 795 835 875 925 
B3/B- 755 765 775 808 845 885 935 
eaa/eee 1155 II 65 1175 1200 1230 1290 1240 
Reuters corporate spreads for Industrials 
Ratings Maturity 
lyr 2yr 3yr 3yr 7yr 10yr 30yr 
Aaa/AAA 10 15 17 20 30 37 52 
AaI/AA+ 15 20 26 30 40 47 60 
Aa2tAA 20 30 32 35 48 57 65 
Aa3/AA- 25 35 37 43 58 67 72 
A If A + 35 45 51 62 76 85 99 
A2/A 45 55 65 78 90 105 122 
A3/A- SS 70 81 88 109 120 143 
Baal/BBB+ 77 92 106 116 129 147 168 
Baa2lBBB 97 112 120 132 145 160 183 
Baa3/BBB- 117 125 133 145 157 172 215 
BaIlBB+ 375 400 355 350 325 300 325 
Ba2lBB 400 525 530 470 425 400 375 
Bal/BB- 475 575 580 525 475 450 525 
BIIB+ 575 650 725 575 525 475 575 
B2tR 600 675 725 600 550 550 850 
BJ/B- 825 925 880 870 825 900 925 











Reuters corporate spreads for Transportation 
Ratings Maturity 
Iyr 2yr 3yr 5yr 7yr IOyr 30yr 
Aaa/AAA 43 53 62 71 85 93 103 
AallAA+ 47 58 67 81 95 103 118 
Aa2/AA 53 63 12 86 110 113 128 
Aa3/AA- 58 68 77 96 115 128 143 
AlIA+ 63 78 87 106 130 143 163 
A2/A 68 88 97 121 140 163 183 
A3/A- 78 93 107 131 150 178 203 
Baa1lBBB+ 98 113 127 146 170 193 218 
Baa2/BBB 113 128 142 161 185 213 238 
Baa3/BBB- 133 148 162 18\ 205 228 253 
BaIlBB+ 650 600 550 500 450 475 425 
Ba2/BB 1000 950 900 700 650 750 600 
Ba3/BB- 1300 1250 1150 1000 900 900 1000 
B1IB+ 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1200 1250 
B2IB 1600 1500 1400 1350 1250 1300 1400 
B3/B- 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1350 1500 
Caa/CCC 2300 2100 1900 1800 1600 1500 1600 
Reuters corporate spreads for Utilities 
Ratings Maturity 
)yr 2yr 3yr 5yr 7yr IOyr 30yr 
Aaa/AAA 16 20 20 22 33 39 61 
AaIlAA+ 26 29 34 47 47 46 77 
Aa2/AA 30 32 36 50 53 64 82 
Aa3/AA- 33 38 45 67 63 75 103 
AtlA+ 36 46 49 72 73 83 101 
A2/A 48 59 63 77 77 93 103 
A3/A- 53 67 64 89 87 94 131 
Baal/BBB+ 62 82 84 106 105 112 136 
Baa2lBBB 75 93 98 113 116 137 153 
Baa3/BBB- 81 123 107 121 126 146 161 
BallBB+ 955 997 1010 883 665 695 720 
Ba2/BB 965 990 1015 885 710 730 780 
Ba3/BB- 975 1000 1020 905 740 785 830 
Bl/B+ 1085 1I25 1255 1160 985 1045 1120 
B2tB 1215 1240 1305 1210 1020 1145 1170 
B3/B- 1290 1330 1410 1310 1170 1245 1320 











Reuters corporate spreads for Financials 
Ratings Maturity 
lyr 2yr 3yr 5yr 7yr IOyr 30yr 
Aaa/AAA 15 20 23 ''l J~ 52 70 85 
AaI/AA+ 44 45 48 58 78 91 108 
Aa2/AA 46 48 SO 64 81 94 116 
Aal/AA- 48 52 54 72 85 97 117 
AlIA+ 85 112 115 120 126 146 162 
A2/A 100 120 122 123 132 151 167 
A3/A- 105 124 126 126 137 156 170 
BaalIBBB+ 118 137 138 147 165 184 202 
Baa2/BBB 123 141 146 159 176 190 212 
Baa3IBBB- 128 146 151 167 187 210 222 
BaIlBB+ 577 587 597 625 645 670 720 
Ba2IBB 587 597 607 635 655 680 730 
Ba3/BB- 597 607 617 645 665 690 740 
BIIB+ 740 760 770 795 830 855 905 
82/8 750 770 780 805 850 955 1055 
B3/B- 760 780 790 815 880 1105 1205 
CaaJCCC 1105 1125 1140 1190 1240 1295 1355 
Reuters corporate spreads for 30-year maturities 
Ratings 30yr Maturity 
Banks Industrials Transportation Utilities FinaDcials 
AaatAAA 80 52 103 61 85 
AaIlAA+ 91 60 118 77 108 
Aa2/AA 94 65 128 82 116 
Aa3/AA- 103 72 143 103 117 
AI/A+ 118 99 163 101 162 
A2/A 122 122 183 103 167 
A3/A- 123 143 203 131 170 
BaaIlBBB+ 177 168 218 136 202 
Baa2/BBB 182 183 238 153 212 
Baa3/BBB- 187 215 253 161 222 
Bal/BB+ 655 325 425 720 720 
Ba2lBB 665 375 600 780 730 
BaJ/BB- 675 525 1000 830 740 
BIIB+ 915 575 1250 1120 905 
B2/B 925 850 1400 1170 1055 
B3/B- 935 925 1500 1320 1205 
CaalCCC 1240 1650 1600 1420 1355 
Note: Reuters evaluator spreads for bullet bonds. 











The first five tables above show the credit spread in basis points for an issue of particular 
credit rating, with a specific tenn to maturity and issued in a specific sector. For example, the 
credit spread for a two year BaaIIBBB+ corporate debt issued in the financial sector is 137 
bp (basis points) and for a Thirty year BaaIIBBB+ corporate debt issued in the same sector 
has 202 bp of credit spread. The last table above was compiled by combining the thirty-year 
corporate bonds issues from the five sectors (Banks, Utilities, Transportation, Industrials, and 
Financials) represented above of different credit ratings to give the corporate spreads for 
thirty-year maturities. 
For each of the above tables, a graph is shown below. The graph depicts the corporate spread 
against credit ratings for specific bond maturities, as shown below. The last graph represents 
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Zero coupon bonds 
Below is an expansion on the previous discussion on Zero coupon bonds: 
• Zero coupon bonds result from the separation of coupons from the body of a security. 
• Zeros sell at deep discounts from face value. 
• The difference between the purchase price of the zero and its face value when 
redeemed is the investor's return. 
• Zeros can be purchased from private brokers and dealers, but not from the Federal 
Reserve or any government agency. 
Creating Zeros by Coupon Stripping 
Coupon stripping is the act of detaching the interest payment coupons from a note or bond 
and treating the coupons and the body as separate securities. Each coupon, or interest 
payment, entitles its owner to a specified cash return on a specific date; the body of the 
security calls for repayment of the principal amount at maturity. The body ofthe stripped 
securities and the separate coupons are known as "zero coupons" or "zeros" because there are 
no periodic interest payments on each instrument. After stripping, the body and coupons are 
sold at a deep discount from their face values. An STRIP owner benefits only from the 
difference between the purchase price and the payment received upon sale or at maturity. 
For example, a 20-year bond with a face value of$20,000 and a 10% interest rate could be 
stripped into its principal and its 40-semi-annual interest payments. The result would be 41 
separate zero coupon instruments, each with its own maturity date. The principal would be 
worth $20,000 upon maturity. and each interest coupon $1,000, or one-half the annual 
interest of 10% on $20,000. Each of the 41 securities, now possessing a distinct ID number, 
could be traded separately until its maturity date at prices determined by the market. 
Proliferation o/Treasury STRIPS 
Some Treasury securities were traded in the secondary market without one or more of their 
interest coupons in the late 1 970s. Stripped securities offered investors a financial instrument 











before their maturity date. However, their popularity raised fears within the Treasury 
Department that zeros would result in a sizable loss of tax revenues. Detached coupons and 
the body of the security were sold at deep discounts, $0.05 or $0.10 on the dollar. After 
purchase, an investor claimed a capital loss on the difference between the sale price of the 
security and its face value, thus reducing the investor's overall tax liability. The Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 adjusted the tax treatment of stripped 
securities to reduce their tax advantage. The Treasury Department then withdrew its 
objections to coupon stripping, prompting several securities dealers to create new products 
incorporating receipts for stripped debt securities. TEFRA also required the Treasury to 
begin issuing all of its securities in book-entry (electronic) form only from January 1983. 
This provision eliminated Treasury issues of bearer notes and bonds with coupons attached. 
Physical stripping would no longer be possible. 
In response, bond dealers began to market receipts that evidenced ownership of Treasury 
zeros held by a custodian. The first of these "receipt products" were named Treasury 
Investment Growth Receipts, or TIGRS. Similar products appeared in 1984, such as 
Certificates of Accrual on Treasury Securities (CATS) and Treasury Receipts (TRs). 
However, most of these securities were not exchangeable with other stripped securities, and 
thus lacked the liquidity customers had come to expect from "zero" instruments. 
In February 1985, the Treasury took a more active role by introducing its own coupon-
stripping program called STRIPS, an acronym for Separate Trading of Registered Interest 
and Principal of Securities. The STRIPS program was intended primarily to reduce the cost 
of financing the public debt "by facilitating competitive private market initiatives." 
Under the STRIPS program, U.S. government issues with maturities often years or more 
became eligible for transfer over Fedwire. The process involves wiring Treasury notes and 
bonds to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and receiving separated components in 
return. This practice also reduced the legal and insurance costs customarily associated with 
the process of stripping a security. In May 1987, the Treasury began to allow the 











Part of a Balanced Portfolio 
Stripped securities can be purchased only from private dealers and brokers. Although the 
Federal Reserve provides services to the zero coupon market, it does not actually sell these 
securities for the Treasury. Financial services companies decide when and what portion of an 
eligible security are stripped and sold. Because their increase in value is taxable yearly as it 
accrues, zeros have become most popular for investments on which taxes can be deferred, 
such as individual retirement accounts and pension plans, or for nontaxable accounts. 
However, their known cash value at specific future dates enables savers and investors to 
tailor their use to a wide range of portfolio objectives. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (June 2003). 
Appendix B.1 
Corporate bond yield spreads 
The bond yield spread of four of the six corporate bonds issued by the six chosen US companies that 
were used to explain the different credit ratings in Appendix A.I are shown here in Appendix B.l. 
The four companies tabulated have ratings: Aaa, Ba2, and Baa2. 
See Appendix 8.1 on disk. 
Appendix B.2 
Yield spread grapbs 
The bond yield spreads tabulated above in Appendix 8.1 as well as from the other two corporate 
bonds issued by the US firms not shown in Appendix 8.1 but explained in Appendix A.I are 
diagrammatically shown in Appendix 82. See Appendix B.2 on disk. 
Appendix B.3 
Combined spreads 
The graphs in Appendix 8.2 are combined to show the relationship of the yield spreads for corporate 












Dollar price of risk 
Appendix BA gi,es an example of the calculation of the dollar price of risk for a corporate bond as 
explained in section 1,4,1 aboye, See Appendix BA on disk, 
Appendix GARCH (1,1) coupons 
Volatility calculations 
Appendix GARCH (1,1) coupons shows the volatility calculations for the expected Baal option 
prices using the JT model and using the triple-A coupon corporate bond as the reference bond. See 
Appendix GARCH (1,1) coupons on disk. 
Appendix GARCH (1,1) zeros 
Volatility calculations 
Appendix GARCH (1,1) zeros shows the volatility calculations for the expected Baal options prices 
obtained using HW model and the triple-A zero coupon corporate bond as the risk free bond. See 
Appendix GARCH (l,I) zeros on disk. 
For each of the above two Appendices, each appendix includes the answer report, sensitivity report 
and a limits report. These reports are just a summary of the parameters and their characteristics used 
in the iterative process to calculate or model the daily volatilities. See Hull (2000) for the constraints 
and characteristics of the parameters used. 
Appendix HW.1-8 
Expected Baal option prices using the HW model 
See disk attached for Appendix HW.I-8 
Appendix JT.1-8 
Expected Baal option prices using the JT model 
See disk attached for Appendix JT.I-8 together with the volatility calculations as well as the Black 
model calculations used. 
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